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Report and Feedback December 2010 Bridgeport Connecticut Coalition Recount

By

The Connecticut Citizen Election Audit Coalition

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www.CTElectionAudit.org

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Introduction

During the November 2010 General Election, the City of Bridgeport Connecticut ran out of printed ballots in several polling places. Bridgeport relied on photocopied ballots to make up the difference. Some of those polling places were without ballots for periods of time during the normal Election Day. A court ordered that such polling places remain open from 8:00pm to 10:00pm to accommodate voters who may have wished to vote during the periods that ballots were unavailable. For several days Bridgeport was the focus of attention as votes were counted and everyone waited for the final official declaration of results from the City's election officials. The race for governor was close and dependent on the Bridgeport results. Many concerns were raised and remained unanswered, surrounding the accuracy of the vote count and integrity of the election in Bridgeport.

The Connecticut Post submitted Freedom of Information requests to the City of Bridgeport for the ballots. Subsequently the City agreed to make the actual ballots available for the newspaper's recount. The Post then contacted members of the Coalition for advice on counting the ballots. The Coalition member organizations all agreed to assist in the recount by planning the recount method, organizing the counting, recruiting our members as volunteers¹, and organizing volunteers to perform the counting. The Coalition had approximately one week to organize the recount. The Coalition volunteers performed the counting between November 29th, 2010 and December 6th 2010. On December 6th and December 8th the Connecticut Post and Coalition representatives reviewed initial results with the City and, where requested, jointly reviewed Coalition paperwork and ballots to assure that our counts were accurate.

The Coalition thanks the Connecticut Post for providing us this opportunity, for their initiative, and their support of the project. We also thank the City of Bridgeport for making the ballots available, their support of the project, and their exemplary cooperation. This project would not have been possible without the commitment of fifty-six (56) Coalition volunteers providing the equivalent of approximately one-hundred-and-fifteen (115) full days or close to 800 hours to the project. The volunteers responded the to call for participation on extremely short notice; and many had, just one week earlier, completed volunteer post-election audit observation assignments.

¹ Most of the volunteer counters had previously served as volunteer post-election audit observers for the Coalition. Several others also participated. We did not openly solicit members of the general public as we felt we could not handle large numbers of individuals previously unknown to us. We excluded two groups from participation to reduce the possibility of the appearance of a conflict of interest: Bridgeport residents and anyone who was a staff member or played a prominent role in the campaign for Governor.

Scope of the Recount

The Coalition reviewed the ballots, Moderators' Returns and other election documents associated with the election, counted the ballots, counted the check-in list counts, and counted the votes in the race for governor. Our data and conclusions are based solely on that evidence and some discussions during the recount with election officials. We can only comment on the integrity of the original vote count and suggest some ways which may explain some of the differences between our counts and the counts officially reported to the State of Connecticut.

We counted a total of 23,860 ballots: 1,262 of those were absentee ballots, 16,591 were machine-counted ballots and 6,007 were originally hand-counted ballots², with the vast majority of those being photocopied ballots. We believe that all of our counts and summaries of counts are highly accurate. We acknowledge that some of our counts may be off by a very small number of votes or check-in list counts off by a small number of check-ins. Whenever questions arose in the accuracy of results determined by our counting teams and accumulated by data entry, we inspected our paperwork and stacks of ballots making several corrections to our initially entered data. In three cases we recounted all the ballots for a candidate in a district, in just one of those cases we found we had initially miscounted by one vote. Check-in list counts are subject to variations in interpretation of checkers' marks and human error. When our counts varied significantly from election night totals, we checked our calculations and, where appropriate, recounted entire check-in lists. However, small variations can be attributed to differences in interpretation of markings on the lists between the recount volunteers and the officials.

² In some districts we were unable to reliably classify a small number of printed ballots as either machine counted or originally hand counted, but all were counted in the recount.

Summary Results

Each candidate for the governor's race gained votes in the recount when compared to the officially reported results, as follows: Foley (+174), Malloy (+761), and Marsh (+19). These differences parallel candidate shares in the initially reported results. Counting of all ballots in the governor's race resulted in differences in many counts, totaling 1,520 votes miscounted, of these 1,236 were initially under reported and 284 were initially over reported.

It is important to recognize that many of the differences in vote counts are not due to counting errors. While there were many small differences between our counts and the initial counts, and some differences between the numbers apparently reported by moderators in individual districts and the numbers reported to the state, the largest errors occurred in some districts where no originally hand counted ballots were included in official totals and in other districts where it appeared that vote counts from whole piles of originally hand counted ballots were not included in the totals on the Moderator's Return .

In one district, the ballot case contained Provisional Ballots cast at that district but sealed in ballot containers and not brought to the attention of registrars for evaluation or, if applicable, for counting in the election. This represents a communication and training problem between the moderators, head moderator, and registrars. Provisional Ballots should not have been sealed with the other ballots and from the Moderator's Returns should have been recognized as having been voted from the *Provisional Ballot Inventory Form*.

In several districts the counts of ballots differed from the check-in list counts, and in several districts, our counts of the check-in lists differed from the counts on the moderators' reports. In many districts check-in list counts closely paralleled ballot counts, yet some counts were over by 21 ballots or less or under by 30 ballots or less. While some variation can be expected due to the difficulty of interpreting some check-in marks, we found several districts where the check-in lists were clearly not counted accurately. In one district, results were under by 117 ballots less than voters checked- in based on our counts.

Subject to the limitations stated earlier, we find no evidence in the information we inspected and counted that any miscounts or reporting errors were intentional.

Recommendations

Connecticut must do better in the future. This will require appropriate action by election officials and the legislature. At this point we suggest possible components of a comprehensive solution that deserve consideration³:

- **Mandatory formulas for minimum ballot orders.** In the wake of the events in Bridgeport, many have suggested a variety of remedies--from printing a number of ballots using formulas based on past history in similar elections, to at least one ballot for every registered voter in every election. It should be noted that in the November 2010 election, several communities in addition to Bridgeport used emergency photocopied ballots. We recommend that the Secretary of the State work with various stakeholders to develop a mandatory formula to be used by local registrars.

Adoption of emergency plans: It's important to note that, simply printing more ballots only reduces the chance of the specific problem that occurred in Bridgeport. There are other causes that could result in a municipality having to scramble to photocopy ballots or perform hand counting such as a massive power failure or ballots lost in a fire, flood, or accident shortly before or during Election Day.

- **Enforceable laws, regulations, and procedures⁴ for the monitoring of turn-out to provide sufficient warning of ballot shortages,** so that photocopied ballots can be available at polling places in time. For example, many municipalities follow the practice of having polling places report hourly vote counts to the registrars of voters. This practice could be codified to mandate that registrars stay in their offices (not at the polls) on Election Day along with a requirement to report available ballots and turn-out.
- **Enforceable laws, regulations, and procedures for the creation, security, and accounting for all ballots and for the creation and handling of emergency photocopied ballots.**

³ There are a variety of changes in Connecticut election laws and procedures which can reduce the chances of situations similar to what happened in the November election occurring and mitigate the impact when they do occur. Rather than propose an exact or complete set of specific changes we are proposing a list of items for the legislature and election officials to consider, along with some concrete examples of how some of these could be implemented.

⁴ In general, in Connecticut election regulations, procedures, and Secretary of the State directives are not enforceable. For several years the Coalition has called for making the post-election audit procedures enforceable. In a similar way, for any of our recommendations here to be effective they either need to be spelled out in detail in law or the associated regulations and procedures must be made enforceable by law.

- **Additional state-provided training and improved manuals should be available for election officials.** State laws—Sec. 9-192a and Sec. 9-192b—mandate an elections training program for all elections workers, but this program has never been fully implemented. Other than the mandated pre-election training for election officials, provided locally by the registrars of voters, the Secretary of the State staff provides formal training for polling place moderators which certifies them to perform their Election Day duties⁵.

All manuals for polling place moderators, absentee ballot counting, recanvasses, and post-election audits should be reviewed for clarity and completeness and expanded to include accurate methods of hand counting, as well as accumulating, verifying, and reporting results.

- **In addition to head moderators, the Secretary of the State should have the power to order discrepancy recanvasses.**
- **Allow more time for the initial reporting of results, investigation of minor discrepancies, and for the accomplishment of recanvasses and the certification of results⁶.** There should a timeframe for discrepancy recanvasses, followed by a timeframe for subsequent close vote recanvasses. The current post-election and certification schedule in Connecticut should not be viewed as unchangeable. For example there could be a seven business day window for Discrepancy Recanvasses and their reporting and an additional five business day window for Close Vote Recanvasses to allow for changes in the initial reports resulting from Discrepancy Recanvasses.
- **Enforceable laws, regulations, and procedures for the accounting for and public verification of the reporting of election results from counting teams, polling place officials, and head moderators, to the Secretary of the State's Office.** Currently district data is transcribed from scanner tapes to district⁷ Moderators' Returns, then in towns with more than one polling place, transcribed and added to the Head Moderator's Return which is submitted to the Secretary of the State for transcription and summarization on the Secretary's web site. This is an error prone, difficult to verify process.

⁵ The Secretary's staff also provides a day of workshops twice a year at Registrars of Voters' conferences on various topics, such as legislative updates and audit procedures. However, attendance by registrars is not mandatory and the training is insufficient to the need.

⁶ States have a wide variety of election calendars. California counties have up to twenty-eight (28) days after Election Day to count ballots and three (3) additional days to report results. Minnesota has a much different election schedule than Connecticut. In Connecticut recanvasses must be completed within five (5) business days of the election and audits start on day fifteen (15) after the election. In Minnesota, audits must be completed within eight (8) days, and recounts start several days later after the audits, with several more days available for counting than Connecticut has for recanvasses.

⁷ When we say district in this recommendation we also mean and include centralized absentee ballot counting as if it were an additional district reporting results with its unique Moderator's Return.

Theoretically candidates and the public can obtain detailed data from each of the 169 towns and compare that to summary totals on the Secretary of the State's web site. It is a time consuming, error-prone process, realistically only available to well financed candidates. It is difficult if not impossible for third parties or members of the public to obtain and calculate a complete check of the data. Such analysis is important for public confidence in election accuracy and for third parties to be assured they are not denied future ballot access through counting errors.

Candidates, parties and the public should have centralized access to the detailed contest votes contained in district Moderators' Returns, check-in list counts, and closing scanner tapes. For example, such images of the relevant sections of district Moderators' Returns and scanner tapes could be faxed to the Secretary of the State's Office and automatically posted to the Secretary's web site for public viewing. Detailed district data could be posted and downloadable from that same web site for public analysis and comparison with the district returns and tapes.

- **Require detailed reporting of votes for cross-endorsed candidates**, such that votes for each cross-endorsed candidate, the respective party and those classified as party 'Unknown' are each reported separately on Moderators' Returns and to the Secretary of the State.⁸

⁸ Unknowns are where a voter fills in bubbles twice for a cross-endorsed candidate; in this election, the "unknown" votes for Governor, by current Secretary of the State's directive, should have been reported as part of the Working Families result. The Secretary also suggested to towns that for other cross-endorsements they be split between the parties. Varying procedures and accounting that differs from the scanner tapes can lead to ambiguity and error.

Why Connecticut Must Do Better

While all of the differences we found are explainable and understandable, given the circumstances in this election in Bridgeport, voters deserve more accurate results and democracy requires it.

In a somewhat tighter race, the differences in Bridgeport could easily have precluded a critical recanvass, or caused an otherwise unnecessary recanvass.

Further, several, if not most, of the largest errors in Bridgeport might have been detected if the check-in list counts had been compared to the number of votes counted in the respective districts. If such examination had been done we believe that the initially reported numbers would have been much more accurate. If they were checked and detected a few days after the election, then the Bridgeport Head Moderator could have called for a discrepancy recanvass⁹ in those districts or for all districts in Bridgeport. The potential for counting and reporting errors require more flexible deadlines on Election Day. Deadlines for determining close vote recanvasses and discrepancy recanvasses should also be extended to verify preliminary election results and to correct reporting errors.

In November 2010 other municipalities also utilized emergency photocopied ballots. We do not know how accurately or inaccurately they counted those ballots.

Fortunately, as noted earlier, each candidate for governor gained votes in the recount and the differences paralleled candidate shares in the initially reported results. In this case, voters in Connecticut can be confident that counting and reporting errors in Bridgeport would not have changed the apparent and certified winner in this election.

⁹ Given the circumstances in Bridgeport surrounding the counting and the extended time involved there was little time available to review the results and call a discrepancy recanvass in the three day period after the election allowed by law.

Results

The Coalition accumulated district results in individual worksheets for each election district, central absentee ballot counting, and provisional ballots. The data was summarized in a single worksheet. The summary worksheet has four tables: one for the accumulated results reported to the Secretary of the State; one accumulating results of the Coalition recount; one showing the differences between the Coalition recount and reported results; and one accumulating check-in list counts originally reported and from the recount:

Votes Reported To The Secretary Of The State					
	Foley - Rep	Malloy - Dem	Malloy - Wkt	Malloy Total	Marsh - Ind
Regular Votes	3890	16051	884	16935	113
Post 8:00pm	8	54	7	61	0
Absentee Ballots	201	933	44	977	3
Provisional	5	37	0	37	0
Total All votes Reported	4104	17075	935	18010	116

Bridgeport provided a spreadsheet of district results that election officials reported to the Secretary of the State's Office. The report had three counts for each district for each candidate: Regular Votes, Post 8:00pm, and Absentee.

Within six (6) days after the election, the registrars are required to accept or reject sealed provisional ballots and report such totals to the Secretary of the State. The provisional ballots were recounted and compared to the official reports provided by City officials.

The Coalition made a summary comparison between the reported results and our recount results. In some cases the results apparently reported by district moderators were incorrectly transcribed, added, or missed when the reported totals were aggregated.

Votes Counted in the Recount					
	Foley - Rep	Malloy - Dem	Malloy - Wkt	Malloy Total	Marsh - Ind
Recount of Orig Machine Counted	2965	12121	913	13034	96
Recount of Orig Hand Counted	1088	4350	352	4702	34
Absentee Ballots	220	957	41	998	3
Provisional	5	36	1	37	2
Total All Votes Counted	4278	17464	1307	18771	135

While the official reports totaled all ballots counted in each district, to the extent possible¹⁰, the Coalition counted originally machine counted ballots separately from hand counted ballots. We did this for two reasons:

- This provided an opportunity to attribute differences in totals separately between originally machine and hand counted ballots. These differences are available in the detailed data, but not in the summary data.
- We wanted to count ballots in the same manner as we would have expected they would have been counted on election night: Machine counting ignores voter intent and counts votes for bubbles it recognizes as filled in^{11,12}.

Absentee ballots were initially reported and counted centrally, by district. Due to the use of identical ballots for several districts and their comingling in the ballot bag, the Coalition counted and reported on the Absentee ballots as a whole.

¹⁰ In some districts we were unable to determine which printed ballots were hand counted and which were machine counted. Usually, in cases of ambiguity all printed ballots were included in our machine count numbers in the recount.

¹¹ Connecticut's scanners are specified as recognizing ovals that are at least 16% filled-in. We classified as questionable any bubble that we judged was less than 25% filled in. Our experience in observing post-election audits and the recount is that most bubbles with marks are recognized by the scanners.

¹² When counting votes in Connecticut's audits, votes are classified based on how well ovals are filled in, classified into *Undisputed* – meaning that the scanner should have read the oval and *Questionable* – meaning the scanner might or might not have read the bubble. In the recount we followed the same method to count originally machine counted votes. When the original machine count was between the totals of undisputed and the total of undisputed plus the questionable votes, we used the scanner count in our totals, otherwise we used our counts, which in such cases often included more or less ballots than were originally scanned.

Vote Count Differences					
	Foley - Rep	Malloy - Dem	Malloy - Wkf	Malloy Total	Marsh - Ind
Printed & Photocopied From Polls	155	366	374	740	17
Absentee Ballots	19	24	-3	21	0
Provisional	0	-1	1	0	2
Net Gain, Recount	174	389	372	761	19
Recount > Original Count	206	630	375	1005	25
Original Count > Recount	32	241	3	244	8
Total miscounts	238	871	378	1249	33

Overall, each candidate for governor gained votes in the recount as follows Foley (+174), Malloy (+761), and Marsh (+19). Counting of all ballots in the Governor's race resulted in differences in many counts compared with officially reported results. In total 1,520 votes (i.e., adding the Malloy total differences plus Foley and Marsh) were miscounted, miscalculated or misreported. Of these 1,236 were initially under reported and 284 were initially over reported.

These differences parallel candidate shares in the initially reported results. For example, in the initial results Malloy had 81% of the vote; in the recount differences he had 79%.

The differences are not all what we would characterize as *counting errors*. The largest errors were in districts where none of the originally hand counted ballots were included in official totals and in other districts where it seems that large blocks of vote counts were not included in Moderator's Return tally sheet totals. We also noted that seven districts did not count and/or allocate the unknown votes accurately (i.e., unknowns are where a voter filled in bubbles twice for a cross-endorsed candidate; the vote, by SOTS directive, should have been reported as part of the Working Families result).

Check-in Lists

The summary of check-in list counts:

Ballots and Check-In Lists				
	E-Day Total Check-in	Check-in List	Transfers etc.	Absentee
Moderator's Report	24014	22549	224	1241
Recount	23951	22457	222	1272
Total Difference	63			
Recount of Orig Machine Counted	16591			
Recount of Orig Hand Counted	6007			
Absentee Ballots	1262			
Total Ballots Election Day	23860			
Total Votes Over Check-In	177	Compared w/Original		
	115	Compared w/Recount		
Total Votes Under Check-In	352	Compared w/Original		
	196	Compared w/Recount		

In many districts check-in list counts closely paralleled ballot counts, yet some counts were over by 21 ballots or less or under by 30 ballots or less. While some variation can be expected due to the difficulty of interpreting some check-in marks, we found several districts where the check-in lists were clearly not counted accurately.

In one district, results were under by 117 ballots less than voters checked-in based on our counts. To be sure, we repeated our counting twice, repeated our tallying, and reviewed the check-in lists again¹³, since the original counts were close to the actual ballots counted in the recount.

We have no historic measures of the accuracy of such lists in Connecticut.

¹³ On 1/11/2011 we reviewed the Check-In lists at the Bridgeport Town Clerk's office. Numbers that were obviously page by page check-in counts and book totals in each of the two check-in books for the district were approximately equal to our recount totals.

Detailed District By District Results

The spreadsheet with worksheets containing detailed district by district summary and detailed results is available at:

<http://www.CTElectionAudit.org/BridgeportRecount/DistrictResults.xls>

Be sure to read the notes associated with each district and remember that detailed differences in district results are based on moderators' tally sheets, while summary differences are based on officially reported results, differences which can vary based on incorrectly transcribed or accumulated district results. These worksheets are provided "as is" at the end of the recount, with formatting refinements left for future recounts.

A samples of our data collection forms are also provided at

<http://www.CTElectionAudit.org/bridgeport-recount-details>

Appendix A: How The Recount Was Accomplished

The Bridgeport recount was performed by 56 citizen volunteers generously giving approximately 115 full days to publicly count all the votes in Bridgeport. A large majority of these citizens had previously observed and reported on post-election audits for the Connecticut Citizen Election Audit Coalition. These volunteers were recruited, scheduled and confirmed starting five days prior to the recount, using the Coalition's web sign-up and scheduling system developed for the post-election audits. This same system was used to recruit additional volunteers as the audit extended into Friday and Monday.

Preparations

In the days before the recount, several Coalition members drafted detailed, yet tentative methods and forms for the Recount. Given the short time frame, it was impossible to develop formal training or to test the forms and counting procedures. Inadequacies, inconsistencies, and refinements were to be expected. Training would be hands on, with close supervision, especially at the start to make sure procedures were well understood and followed, while problems could be surfaced and detailed procedures adjusted.

Overall District Procedures

The overall procedure for each district was to observe the unsealing of the ballot case; inventory and record the contents; count the various packages and types of ballots; count the votes in each category of ballots; and input totals into spreadsheets for each district. The general types of ballots categories were: printed, photocopied, absentee, write-in, provisional, originally machine counted, originally hand counted, and spoiled. Data was collected from district Moderators' Returns, tally sheets, check-in lists, and official vote count reports to the Secretary of the State. Check-in lists were recounted and Moderators' Returns were analyzed by special teams. Finally, the initial recount numbers were compared to the official numbers and where questions arose either by the Coalition or from Bridgeport officials, the ballots, votes, and accounting was reexamined or recounted as appropriate to assure the recount figures were accurate.

Counting In Teams of Five

Counting was performed by teams of four counters and a supervisor/ballot clerk. Detailed counting included careful examination of ballots for questionable votes, write-ins, or voter intent issues. Ballots first were counted in stacks of twenty-five (25) and recounted to determine the total number of ballots. Subsequently, stacks of fifty (50) ballots (and a remaining stack of fewer ballots) were created and votes counted on each stack by teams of four, using the hashmark method: One individual read each ballot, while a second individual watched the ballot to make sure the reading was accurate. Two individuals completed identical hashmark sheets for each stack - if the individuals sheets did not agree, then the team resolved the issue by recounting the ballots.

Hashmarks were made for each ballot, including undervotes and overvotes, such that the number of hashmarks could be cross checked to equal the number of ballots in the stacks. Stacks were clipped with metal clips, along with one of the hashmark sheets for resealing, while the other hashmark sheet was saved for the district recount paperwork for processing by the accounting team. Special stacks such as questionable ballots (those with partially filled in bubbles), write-ins, and voter intent issues were scrutinized with the assistance of recount leaders to assure accuracy and consistency.

Two Distinct Ways Of Counting Ballots

While the official reports totaled all ballots counted in each district, to the extent possible the Coalition counted machine counted ballots separately from hand counted ballots. We did this for two reasons:

- This provided an opportunity to attribute differences in totals separately between machine and ballots counted by hand at the close of Election Day. These differences are shown in the detailed data, but not in the summary data.
- We wanted to count and report on votes in the same manner as they would have been counted on election night. For example, machine counting ignores *voter intent* and simply recognizes filled-in ovals as votes to be counted.¹⁴

In some districts we were unable to determine which printed ballots were hand counted and which were machine counted. Usually, in cases of ambiguity, all of the printed ballots were included in our machine count numbers in the recount.

For hand counted ballots, we used *voter intent* as our guide. There were a very few ballots that required subjective interpretation of the intent of the voter. It is possible that for a few votes on a few ballots our judgment may have varied from equally fair interpretations by election officials.

For machine counted ballots we counted as *questionable votes* those markings that may or may not have been read by a scanner. Connecticut's scanners, all AccuVote-OS scanners, are specified to recognize marks in ovals that are at least 16% filled-in. We classified any oval less than 25% filled in, to be "*questionable*". Our experience in observing post-election audits and in the recount is that most ovals with marks, no matter how small, are actually recognized by the scanners. When the machine count was between the total of non-questionable votes (called *undisputed* in Connecticut's audits) and the total of questionable plus non-questionable we used the scanner count in our totals, otherwise we used our counts, which in such cases often included more or less ballots than were originally scanned. It is normal for some printed ballots to be counted by hand in Connecticut on election night. It was frequently not possible to distinguish originally hand counted printed ballots from originally scanned printed ballots. In such cases we counted them together.

¹⁴ Considering questionable ovals there is a range of expected scanner results provided by the hand count. In accumulating statistics we use the original scanner tape numbers when they were within range and our numbers when the originals were out of range.

For machine counted ballots we also treated write-in ballots as the machine would have reported them. Write-ins in the race for governor were counted simply as write-ins (except if a voter identified Malloy, Foley or Marsh. In that case they were counted and reported as part of that candidate's results.) Normal votes for governor on ballots with write-ins in other races were counted for the appropriate candidate. Since write-in ballots were handled separately from all other ballots, we also checked for and separately accounted for questionable votes in the race for governor on write-in ballots.

If The Coalition Were Ever Called Upon Again

If there were more time available to prepare, train, and test the procedures and forms, the processing for each district would have been handled at one time with the ballots unsealed and resealed only once. In the Bridgeport recount, the assessment of Moderators' Returns, check-in lists, and tally sheets lagged the counting of ballots. Spreadsheets for tallying the votes needed major adjustments over the first two days. Thus, it was late in the recount process that all data became available to compare with the initial recount totals for each district and areas for further investigation, correction, or verification were determined. The last day of the recount was spent reopening ballot containers, to verify and correct initial recount data, when necessary. In the future, we would also photograph the relevant pages of Moderators' Returns, the associated tally sheets, and possibly some of the envelope notations found within the ballot containers.

Overall, considering the time we had to prepare and that this was our first effort of this nature, we are pleased with our plan, organization, methods, and the results. In particular, for the hashmarking method we strongly recommend teams of five, keeping stacks together by metal clips, and the system of keeping one hashmark sheet with each stack, while using the other for accounting. We would also recommend that if at all possible, the stacks of ballots and hashmark sheets remain clipped together when ballots are resealed – this dramatically reduced the time and effort required to verify, correct, and demonstrate the accuracy of our work.

In the future, should the Coalition ever be called upon to provide a similar service, based on the lessons learned and the forms created in Bridgeport, a recount will proceed even more smoothly and more efficiently.