

# Connecticut Post-Election Audit Observation, Nov 2009

## 1. Identification, Location, Start

Directions:

- 1) Please answer each question, answering N/A or 'Not\_Observed' if appropriate.
- 2) On paper forms it is OK to write outside of or beyond the lines.
- 3) Observation problems or questions: Call L. Weeks at (860) 918-2115.

### 1. Observation

Town Observed

Date of Observation

On-Site Audit Supervisor(s) [Usually Registrars]

### 2. Observer(s)

Last Name

First Name

Best Phone Number

Other Coalition Observers

3. Is this a joint report by all Coalition observers? (Note: Multiple observers can submit a single report. If so, everyone should discuss and agree with all responses after the completion of the observation.)

☐ Yes - all observers combined observations

☐ No - multiple reports will be submitted

### 4. Start Times

	HH	MM	AM/PM
Scheduled Start of Today's Audit	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Time You Arrived	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
Actual Start of Today's Audit	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

5. What was Audited? [If multiple districts are audited there may be different races audited in each]

1st District Audited	<input type="text"/>
1st District Races Audited	<input type="text"/>
2nd District Audited	<input type="text"/>
2nd District Races Audited	<input type="text"/>
3rd District Audited	<input type="text"/>
3rd District Races Audited	<input type="text"/>

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## 2. Opening, Orientation, Room Layout

### 6. Opening Chain of Custody & Ballot Transport

	Yes	No	Not_Observed
Were the ballots delivered to the site by at least two individuals?	jn	jn	jn
Were the ballots under the observation of at least two individuals at all times during the observation?	jn	jn	jn
Were you permitted to observe that ballot container seals were not tampered with?	jn	jn	jn
Were the ballot container seals intact?	jn	jn	jn
Were you able to see the seals and the seal numbers on the Moderator's Return?	jn	jn	jn

Please explain any No answers above:

Check the actual seal numbers broken today and the numbers on the Moderator's Return from election day.

### 7. Ballot Container Seal Numbers

List seal numbers on Moderator's Return

List seal numbers broken today to open containers

### 8. Training and Orientation

	Yes	No	Not_Observed
Did the supervisor review the state audit procedures with the counting team?	jn	jn	jn
Did the supervisor clarify procedures for everyone before beginning to count ballots?	jn	jn	jn
Did supervisor review the ballot and vote counting procedures in detail with the counting team(s)?[e.g. The role of each person on a team. Size of batches? Two officials should check each vote and hashmark etc.]	jn	jn	jn

Use this space if further explanation is needed

### 9. Please describe the room layout and counting team arrangements

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## 3. Observing And Verifying The Counting

NOTE:

- 1) Please answer the following questions based on what could have been observed even if you were not able to actually observe everything yourself.
- 2) There are two methods of counting generally employed: a) stacking/piling of ballots then counting the votes or b) hashmarking then counting the hashmarks.

### 10. Ballot counting

	Yes	No	N/A	Not_Observed
Was the number of BALLOTS counted before the VOTES were counted for races?	jn	jn	jn	jn
Were the ballots counted such that a 2nd election official verified each count?	jn	jn	jn	jn
If multiple teams counted ballots, was the totaling independently verified by a second election official?	jn	jn	jn	jn

### 11. What method was used to count VOTES in races? [Note: This question asks about how races were counted, not how ballots were counted]

	Stacking/Piles Method	Hashmarking Method	Combination of Stacking/Piles and Hashmarking
Method:	jn	jn	jn

### 12. Counting methods for votes in races, by one or more teams of counters.

- jn All teams used the hashmark method for all votes for races
- jn All teams used the stacking/piles method for all votes for races
- jn Methods varied by race but for each race the teams all used the same method
- jn Methods varied between teams even for the same race

If applicable, how did methods vary between teams?

Answer the following question based on all the counting and counting teams you actually observed

### 13. Double Checking By Officials?

	Yes	No	N/A
<u>IF HASHMARKING USED:</u> Did a second official observe that each vote was read accurately?	jn	jn	jn
<u>IF HASHMARKING USED:</u> Did a second official make duplicate hashmarks OR observe that each hashmark was recorded accurately?	jn	jn	jn
<u>IF STACKING/PILES USED:</u> Was the vote counting process such that two election officials verified each vote was stacked as marked?	jn	jn	jn
<u>IF STACKING/PILES USED:</u> Were the stacks of ballots counted such that two election officials verified that each stack was counted accurately?	jn	jn	jn

If you answered YES to any question please explain the 2nd official checked the 1st.

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## 4. Observing And Verifying The Counting (Continued)

Answer the following question based on what you were allowed to observe, not based on what you were actually able to observe.

### 14. Transparency and Observability?

	Yes	No	Not_Observed
<u>IF HASHMARKING USED:</u> Were you permitted to see that each vote was read accurately?	jn	jn	jn
<u>IF HASHMARKING USED:</u> Were you permitted to see that each hashmark was recorded accurately?	jn	jn	jn
<u>IF STACKING/PILES USED:</u> Were you permitted to see that each vote was placed in a correct stack?	jn	jn	jn
<u>IF STACKING/PILES USED:</u> Were you permitted to see that the count of ballots in piles was accurate?	jn	jn	jn

Please explain any No answers:

### 15. Blind Counting. [Blind counting occurs when counting teams are unaware of the totals and discrepancies while they are counting or recounting]

	Yes	No	Not_Observed	NA
Were counters kept unaware of the election totals for the ballots or races they were counting until counting and recounting each race was finally complete?	jn	jn	jn	jn
If initial counts were off, were counters kept unaware of the exact and approximate level of difference? [e.g. No indication was given of the amount the count was off]	jn	jn	jn	jn

Please explain any No answers:

### 16. Ballots with "Questionable" Markings That Might Not Have Been Read Correctly By The Machine

	Yes	No	Not_Observed
Were votes on questionable ballots ruled upon separately race by race for reporting as questionable votes in the Audit Report? [Rather than all votes on every questionable ballot classified as questionable]	jn	jn	jn
Were votes on such ballots ruled upon prior to the tallying of votes for each race? (And counts not adjusted based on results of the total count for each race?)	jn	jn	jn

Please explain any No answers:

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## 5. Observing And Verifying The Counting (Continued)

### 17. Discovering and resolving mismatches:

	Yes	No	Not_Observed	N/A
Did elections officials find a match between machine counts and manual counts the first time they tried?	jn	jn	jn	jn
Did elections officials resolve mismatched counts by counting again?	jn	jn	jn	jn
Did elections officials resolve mismatched counts by changing counting teams?	jn	jn	jn	jn
Did elections officials resolve mismatched counts by the end of the audit?	jn	jn	jn	jn

Please explain any No answers:

### 18. Tally procedures and tallying transparency:

	Yes	No	Not_Observed	N/A
Were you able to confirm that hashmarks for each team or batch were tallied accurately? (i.e. You could confirm that the number of hashmarks matched the total for each group of hashmarks.)	jn	jn	jn	jn
Were you able to confirm that the number of ballots from multiple teams/batches was tallied accurately?	jn	jn	jn	jn
Were you able to confirm that the number of votes from multiple teams/batches was tallied accurately?	jn	jn	jn	jn

Please explain any No answers:

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## 6. Completing the Observation and Verification

### 19. Verifying and copying report forms:

	Yes	No	Not_Observed	N/A
Did elections officials record counts, including unresolved discrepancies if any, on official forms by the end of the audit?	jn	jn	jn	jn
Were you given an opportunity to have a copy or make a copy of the official forms?	jn	jn	jn	jn
Did the ballot counts on the signed optical scanner tape(s) printed at the end of election-day match the machine ballot count reported on the audit report form(s)?	jn	jn	jn	jn
Did the race counts on the signed optical scanner tape(s) printed at the end of election-day match the machine tape race counts reported on the audit report form(s)?	jn	jn	jn	jn

Please explain any No answers:

### 20. Election Officials, Counting Teams, Observers and Others Present

Number of Supervising Election Officials	<input type="text"/>
Number of Counting Team Personnel	<input type="text"/>
Number of Counting Teams	<input type="text"/>
Number of Individuals on Smallest Counting Team	<input type="text"/>
Number of Public (Including all observers)	<input type="text"/>
Number of Media	<input type="text"/>
Number of Others Present	<input type="text"/>

### 21. # Non-Coalition observers present: If known, who did they represent? (Parties? Candidates?)

### 22. Closing Chain of Custody

	Yes	No	Not_Observed	N/A
Could you confirm that ballots were returned to their proper containers?	jn	jn	jn	jn
Were the ballot containers resealed?	jn	jn	jn	jn
Were seal numbers recorded correctly on forms?	jn	jn	jn	jn

Please explain any answers.

### 23. List Seal Numbers on Containers Resealed Today

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## 7. Completing the Observation and Verification (Continued)

REMEMBER: Please copy the completed Secretary of the State's report forms to your form, or ask for and obtain a copy from the Audit Supervisor before leaving the Audit.

### 24. Completion

Time Today's Audit Ended:  HH :  MM  AM/PM

### 25. Overall Concerns

	Yes	No	Not_Observed
Do you have any concerns over the way the room was laid out?	jñ	jñ	jñ
Do you have any concerns that the auditing was not well-organized?	jñ	jñ	jñ
Do you have any concerns with the integrity of the counting and totaling process?	jñ	jñ	jñ
Do you have any concerns that the manual count was inaccurate?	jñ	jñ	jñ
Do you have any concerns that the officially reported information is inaccurate?	jñ	jñ	jñ
Do you have any concerns with the transparency/observability of the process?	jñ	jñ	jñ
Do you have any concerns with the chain-of-custody?	jñ	jñ	jñ

Please explain any Yes answers:

26. Additional Comments - Entire Survey - Where applicable, please reference question number.

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## 8. Interview Of On-Site Supervisor(s)

Note: Ask to talk to/interview the on-site supervisor at a convenient time. Answering all the questions on this form is optional, however, it will help us understand the election officials views and challenges with the process. It is fine to share this form with them.

### 27. Notification and Ballot Storage

How was the public notified of the date, time and place of the counting session?

Where were the ballots stored after the election?

How is the ballot storage area secured?

Who has access to the ballot storage area and keys to the storage area?

### 28. Election Events

	Yes	No	Not Answered
Were there any ballot related problems on election day?	jn	jn	jn
Were there optical scanner related problems on election day?	jn	jn	jn
Were there any memory card problems during pre-election testing or on election day?	jn	jn	jn
Were there any other significant events, actions, or occurrences before during or after the election that could affect integrity or where procedures could not be or were not followed?	jn	jn	jn

Please explain any Yes answers:

29. Does the On Site Supervisor have any suggestions to improve the audit or observation processes or any other comments?

30. Did one of the supervisors observe the random selection of races by the Municipal Clerk

	Yes	No	NA (all races audited)
Answer	jn	jn	jn

How were the races randomly selected? [If not observed by one of the supervisors, if possible, visit and ask the Municipal Clerk]



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## 9. Observer Feedback To Coalition

31. Please indicate the extent you agree or disagree with each statement, where

SA = Strongly Agree, BA = Agree,

N = Neither Agree nor Disagree, D = Disagree, SD = Strongly Disagree

	SA	A	N	D	SD
Overall, the observation program will help improve the audit process.	ja	ja	ja	ja	ja
I believe that the observation program was effective in explaining what was required of me and other observers.	ja	ja	ja	ja	ja
The observation forms were easy to understand and complete. (Note: This refers to the Observer Report Forms not the Secretary of the State's procedures and forms.)	ja	ja	ja	ja	ja

Please list any questions that you found confusing:

32. I participated in a call-in training session

	For This Audit	For Previous Audit	For This and a Previous Audit	No
Answer:	ja	ja	ja	ja

33. Observation history

	1st Observation	2nd Observation	3rd or Subsequent Observation
This was my:	ja	ja	ja

34. The best thing about this program is...

35. The one thing that would make the program better is...

PLEASE COMPLETE ANY NOTES AND SUBMIT TO THE COALITION  
WITHIN 24 HOURS OF THE COMPLETION OF THE OBSERVATION:

Either:

1) Mail the Secretary of the State's report form copies and the Observer Report to:  
Audit Coalition c/o L. Weeks  
334 Hollister Way West  
Glastonbury, CT 06033

Or better still:

2) Mail the Secretary of the State's report forms and fill Observer Report online at the special link emailed to you.