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Report and Feedback
November 2008
Connecticut
Post-Election Audit Observation

By

The Connecticut Citizen Election Audit Coalition

January 28, 2009

www.CTElectionAudit.org

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Executive Summary

After the November 2008 presidential election, Connecticut conducted its fourth large-scale post-election audit¹. This was also the Connecticut Citizen Election Audit Coalition's fourth audit observation. The coalition was formed to organize citizens to observe the audits. The coalition includes the League of Women Voters Connecticut, Connecticut Common Cause, Connecticut Citizen Action Group, and Connecticut Voters Count. The purpose of the observation was to demonstrate citizen interest in the process, increase citizen involvement in elections, provide feedback to the Secretary of the State and the legislature on the audit process, and provide the public with information necessary to determine their confidence in our elections.

By law, the Secretary of the State is required, in each election, to select at random 10% of Connecticut's voting districts to participate in post-election audits, and, in a presidential election, randomly select three offices for audit in each of those districts. On November 13, 2008, Secretary Bysiewicz chose the 10% of districts to audit and decided to audit all five offices on the ballot.

In this report, we conclude, based on our observations and analysis of audit reports submitted to the Secretary of the State that the November post-election audits still do not inspire confidence because of the continued lack of

- standards,
- detailed guidance for counting procedures, and
- consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.

We also note continuing failures to follow audit and chain-of-custody procedures.

Among our greatest concerns are the discrepancies between machine counts and hand-counts reported to the Secretary of the State by several municipalities. In many cases, these discrepancies are not thoroughly and reasonably explained. We believe that the ad-hoc counting procedures used by many municipalities were not sufficient to count ballots accurately and efficiently.

Several audit supervisors attributed discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts to human limitations; other supervisors attributed these to inaccurate scanners. We find no reason to attribute all errors to either humans or machines

¹ In this document we will frequently use the term "audit" when we mean "post-election audit" or "post-election audit counting session". Technically we believe that the whole process encompassing everything from the preservation of records, random drawings, counting in municipalities, the report by the University of Connecticut, and the evaluation of that report by the Secretary of the State would be the "audit". However, for readability we will usually follow the common practice of using "audit" to refer to parts of the whole.

In each of the last three audit observation reports we have made recommendations to the Secretary of the State and the Legislature. Our last report covered progress between November 2007 and August 2008 on the recommendations². With this current report we have reorganized our list of recommendations, removing those that have been accomplished, while clarifying those that remain. Recommendations are grouped by topic.

² The August report with a review of progress on recommendations is available at:
<http://www.ctelectionaudit.org/Reports/ObservationReportAug08.pdf>

Recommendations

I. Independent Audits

The current system of the conduct of audits by individual towns lacks consistency, accuracy, and professionalism. A nonpartisan, independent audit board or professional team of independent auditors should conduct the audits.

However, if audits continue to be conducted by local officials, we recommend the measures below to improve the security and integrity of Connecticut's election outcomes. Many of these same recommendations would apply if an independent audit board were established, with the board performing many of the audit functions now performed by or recommended to the Secretary of the State.

II. Audit Selection, Notification and Reporting*

*would also apply to independently-conducted audits

A. Amend PA 07-194 on selection and notification to:

1. require that the Secretary of the State randomly select the races to be audited during the same public event as the random selection of districts. In elections where federal and/or constitutional statewide offices appear on the ballot, at least one such race should be randomly selected from those federal races on the ballot and one race selected from statewide races on the ballot.
2. require that races randomly selected for audit be chosen by the Secretary of the State for all districts.
3. require that towns selected for audit be officially notified of their selection in a legally acceptable form, including an immediate posting of the list of audit sites on the Secretary of the State's Website.
4. require that towns provide ample notice of the scheduling and location of post-election audits to the Secretary of the State and on their municipal websites or local newspapers. We urge the Secretary of State's office to review how other states are establishing and publicizing the schedule of audits and race selection to ensure maximum public notice and transparency.

B. Amend PA 07-194 to mandate deadlines for:

1. random selection of audit locations
2. completion of audits
3. municipalities to report audit results to the Secretary of the State's office

C. Amend PA 07-194 on reporting to:

1. mandate a deadline for completion of required UConn reports and require that those reports include statistical data on deviations from the standards set in the audit law and reports on any incomplete or missing audit data
2. mandate timely publication of a final comprehensive report of each statewide audit and require that the report include local statistics and analysis from local audit report forms, elections officials' and observers' (if any) observations, and conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the audit. The report should be readily available to the public

D. Amend PA 07-194 on reporting to:

- require that audit reports be compared to the machine tapes and election night or final amended reports to assure that the correct machine tape counts are recorded. Audit reports should be amended to require that ballot transfer case seal numbers from election night, audit day (if different), and post-audit be submitted on the audit reports.

III. General Provisions

A. Procedures that will yield trusted audits must be specified in law or regulation and must be made enforceable by the State Elections Enforcement Commission. Procedures should also provide a mechanism for the Secretary of State's office to report irregularities to appropriate authorities such as the State Elections Enforcement Commission.

B. The Secretary of State's Office should:

1. establish mechanisms and controls to audit the audits (log, detect and take action on errors) to assure that prescribed methods are followed. Audit reports that are incomplete or contain obvious or unexplained discrepancies should be rejected by the Secretary of State's office and corrective action taken by election officials.
2. increase competency of registrars and election officials in election audits through mandatory educational programs that include security, audit organization, and conduct; the steps and details of the audit procedures; counting methods; and organizing and supervising the audit teams.

C. Amend PA 07-194 to:

1. mandate investigation and independent analysis of data discrepancies which are not thoroughly and reasonably explained .

2. require that copies of the Moderators' Returns, and machine tapes, be present at the audit for review
3. mandate that all ballots in all elections remain sealed until thirty days after all audits and audit investigations are complete. They should be released only after the Secretary of the State's notification in writing that the audit and investigations are complete. During that period ballots should only be unsealed temporarily for the purpose of recounts, audits, and state investigations – and resealed whenever audits, recounts, and investigations are complete or continued.
4. resolve the conflicting demands for any extended audit investigations with the need for re-programming of memory cards in preparation for new elections or referenda.
5. limit the role that candidates can perform in the post-election audit process. Opposed candidates, even if they are sitting registrars, should not supervise or have official roles in post-election audits. The Secretary of State's office should develop procedures to identify who will supervise and have an official role in audits in cases of this kind of conflict.
6. set forth specific and enforceable criteria for chain of custody, access logs, and secure storage facilities for ballots, memory cards, and machines. The Secretary of the State's office should establish a system of random unannounced inspections of storage facilities and access logs.

IV. Audit Procedures

A. The Secretary of the State should provide detailed guidance on methods of auditing that are efficient, transparent, specific, and accurate. National efforts should be reviewed, such as California's recently adopted audit procedures, the audit practices of Minnesota, recommendations of the Brennan Center, and the Principles and Best Practices for Post Election Audits³.

B. The Secretary of State should amend procedures to:

1. remove the subjectivity associated with the identification of what constitutes an undisputed ballot and a ballot containing a questionable vote.
2. require all tallies be performed in public and audit reports be filled out as part of the actual public audit and displayed publicly at the end of the audit along with the tally sheets.

³ <http://www.electionaudits.org/principles>

3. require that the results of all original manual counts and repeated counts, when necessary, be reported to the Secretary of the State's Office.
4. incorporate a requirement for "blind counting" into audit procedures.

V. Public Involvement

Observers rights should be established in law. As long as observers don't interfere with the hand counting process, the public should be allowed to observe and verify all phases of the election audit from district and race selection through any follow-up investigation.

I. Introduction

After the November 2008 presidential election, Connecticut conducted its fourth large-scale post-election audit. This was also the Connecticut Citizen Election Audit Coalition's fourth audit observation. The coalition was formed to organize citizens to observe the audits. The coalition includes the League of Women Voters Connecticut, Connecticut Common Cause, Connecticut Citizen Action Group, and Connecticut Voters Count. The purpose of the observation was to demonstrate citizen interest in the process, increase citizen involvement in elections, provide feedback to the Secretary of the State and the legislature on the audit process, and provide the public with information necessary to determine their confidence in our elections.

By law, the Secretary of the State is required, in each election, to select at random 10% of Connecticut's voting districts to participate in post-election audits, and, in a presidential election, randomly select three offices for audit in each of those districts. On November 13, 2008, Secretary Bysiewicz chose the 10% of districts to audit, but, instead of selecting three races to audit, the Secretary chose to audit all five offices on the ballot. Although we do not know the reasons for the Secretary's decision, we do appreciate the value of auditing the most important offices rather than leaving that to chance in a random drawing that would not be open to public observation.

The audit counting sessions were required to be conducted between November 19, 2008 and November 24, 2008. Eighty-four (84) districts within 56 towns were selected for audits. Seventy-seven (77) volunteers observed forty-seven (47) of these audits, providing feedback on the process to the coalition. Volunteer citizen-observers provided invaluable information, often attending audits on short notice, several attending multiple audits, and accommodating schedule changes.

All coalition reports covering this and previous audit observations are available at <http://www.CTElectionAudit.org>

We appreciate the cooperation and assistance of the Connecticut Secretary of the State's office with this project. We also found the majority of Connecticut's registrars of voters welcoming to our participation and candid in generously answering our interview questions.

A. Citizen Observation: Improvements and Limitations

For this round of audit observations, we reorganized our forms using the SurveyMonkey online tool to make the forms and questions clearer. This also facilitated computing results which will be compared statistically with several other states using similar forms. We were pleased that approximately half of our observers submitted their report forms online. There is still room for improvement in simplifying the forms, clarifying the questions and communicating a full understanding of some questions to all observers.

The Coalition made some minor edits to the observers' reports. When an observer's response to a question was in obvious conflict with an expanded comment on that question, indicating to us that our question had been misunderstood, we corrected for the appropriate response. In other cases where the observer's meaning was not as obvious, we followed-up with observers to make sure our report was as accurate as possible.

We do not claim that all of our raw data is completely accurate, that observers saw everything, or that they interpreted each question consistently. Some of our observations are incomplete because, for example, some audits had to be continued into a second day at which our observers were unable to be present. However, when taken as a whole, the observations tell a collective story that is quite consistent and valuable.

Without our volunteer observers willing to invest a day of their time, available for short-notice scheduling, and observing to the best of their ability, nobody but local election officials would know how post-election audits are conducted in Connecticut. Our observers care about democracy and ensuring that measures are in place to protect the integrity of our elections.⁴ We also acknowledge the help of student observers from the Institute for Political Social Work at the UConn School of Social Work.

B. Purpose of Connecticut's Random, Post-Election Audits

As stated in the Office of the Secretary of the State's Post-Election Audit Procedures:

The primary purpose of the hand count audit is to assess how well the optical scan voting machines functioned in an actual election and to ensure that votes cast using these machines are counted properly and accurately.

The recently published: *Principles and Best Practices for Post-Election Audits*⁵ includes the following definition and benefits (purposes):

Well-designed and properly performed post-election audits can significantly mitigate the threat of error, and should be considered integral to any vote counting system. A post-election audit in this document refers to hand-counting votes on paper records and comparing those counts to the corresponding vote counts originally reported, as a check on the accuracy of election results, and resolving discrepancies using accurate hand counts of the paper records as the

⁴ Upon request of registrars of voters, the Coalition would be pleased to discuss Coalition feedback and observation reports applicable to their municipality.

⁵ Principles and Best Practices for Post-Election Audits: <http://www.electionaudits.org/principles>, These Principles and Best Practices can be used as a benchmark to compare post-election audits to an ideal. This document is a follow-on to the definition from the 2007 Post-Election Audit Summit referenced in our previous reports.

benchmark. Such audits are arguably the most economical component of a quality voting system, adding a very small cost for a large set of benefits.

The benefits of such audits include:

- Revealing when recounts are necessary to verify election outcomes*
- Finding error whether accidental or intentional*
- Deterring fraud*
- Providing for continuous improvement in the conduct of elections*
- Promoting public confidence in elections*

C. Background

For more detailed background information, please refer to the Introduction to our previous observation reports available at <http://www.CTElectionAudit.org>.

Forms for the November 2008 Audit Observation, including the Observer Code of Conduct, the Observer Report Form, and the Secretary of the State's Post-Election Audit Procedures are available at: <http://CTElectionAudit.org/Nov2008.htm>

II. Analysis

In this report, we conclude, based on our observations and analysis of audit reports submitted to the Secretary of the State that the November post-election audits still do not inspire confidence because of the continued lack of

- standards,
- detailed guidance for counting procedures, and
- consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.

A. Procedures Unenforceable, Current Laws Insufficient

As we've noted in previous reports, discussions with the Secretary of the State's Office and representatives of the State Elections Enforcement Commission indicate that many, if not all, of the audit procedures are unenforceable.

Based on discussions with the State Elections Enforcement Commission (SEEC) staff members, our understanding is that the law specifically gives the SEEC the power to enforce only provisions of specific sections of the statutes, leaving Secretary of the State's regulations, rulings, procedures, and directives unenforceable even if they are intended to detail requirements which are imposed by the law. There is no incentive for following the current procedures and no penalty for disregarding them.

We note that the adherence to prescribed chain-of-custody and ballot security procedures varies widely among audited districts. Laws that govern the sealing of ballots, memory cards, and tabulators after an election are unclear. Ballots are not maintained in secure facilities such that all access is reliably, credibly recorded, and such that two individuals are required for access. In most towns both registrars, and in many towns several other individuals, have unsupervised individual access to the sealed ballots. The lack of uniform security of the ballots diminishes confidence in the integrity of the ballots counted in an audit.

We emphasize that this report does not question any individual's integrity. However, we do not believe a secure system is one that relies on single individuals with opportunity to alter records.

Please refer to our August report for more details.

B. Procedures Are Not Being Followed, Understood

The Secretary of the State's office published minor improvements to the audit procedures. With changes made over the course of the year, the procedures are more clear, consistent, and complete than those used one year ago. However, they were frequently not followed, are not enforced, and, as noted above, may not be enforceable. Additionally, the procedures still lack detailed guidance in efficient methods of counting that provide accurate and observable results. See Section C. below.

Our observations indicate that some towns do a good job of using the procedures in the audit, following each step in order. However, in other towns, there is no evidence that town officials are referencing or following the procedures. Some who attempt to follow the steps do not seem to understand them and appear to be reading the procedures for the first time at the start of the session.

Problems uncovered in this observation included lack of appropriate public notification of the audit schedule, incorrectly completed forms, chain-of-custody problems, decisions and actions contrary to procedures and the law, and lingering transparency concerns.

Lack of Appropriate Notification to Selected Towns and to the Public

The Secretary of the State's office notifies the towns by means of an e-mail and voice mail that they have been selected to participate in a post-election audit. However, e-mail addresses change, messages can be lost in transit or incorrectly classified as spam, phone numbers change, and part time registrars often go days without listening to voice mail or checking emails.

Despite a requirement that municipalities provide the Secretary of the State with three business days notice of the schedule and location of an audit and despite repeated calls to registrars, we were unable to determine dates, times, and locations of all audits with the required advanced notice. Although we note continuing improvement in this area, we also note the following problems:

- Several towns indicated they had first learned of their selection from another town or read of their selection in the newspaper. Several learned of their selection from our call.
- One municipality called us mid morning to notify us of an audit beginning at 4:00pm that same day. They explained that they could not provide longer notice as they had determined the audit date and time that same morning.
- One municipality stated several times that they were not selected for audit as the Secretary of the State had not notified them of the audit. We also passed this information on to the Secretary of the State's Office. Unknown to us until after the fact, that municipality performed the audit one day after the close of the audit period.

Incorrectly Completed Forms

An analysis of the eighty-four (84) district reports submitted by the municipalities to the Secretary of the State, we note that fifteen (15) reporting forms were not accurately completed. Although this represents an improvement from past audits, it is difficult to create comprehensive statistics or to rely on the audit as a vehicle for assessing the scanners' ability to count every ballot.

- Seven (7) districts submitted forms that omitted either the number of machine-counted ballots to be included in the audit or the number of hand-counted ballots that were actually counted .

- Two (2) districts audited only four races of the five required by the Secretary of the State.
- Four (4) districts submitted report forms on which Column D or Column F was not completed as required⁶.

Chain of Custody

Several reports revealed multiple concerns with chain of custody. In twelve (12) observations,⁷ observers expressed concerns with the chain of custody in the following ways:

- Six (6) observations indicated that the ballots were not under the observation of two individuals at all times.
- Two (2) observations indicated that the ballot transfer cases were opened prior to the announced start time of the audit.
- Four (4) observations reported that ballot transfer case seals were not intact.
- Three (3) towns failed to reseal the ballots at the end of the audit. This is an improvement over the seven (7) cases observed in August.
- Three (3) observers reported that seals had been applied on election night and were still intact. However, these seals did not, in fact, seal the ballot transfer cases containing the ballots. According to these observers:

Ballots never sealed properly because seals were not through proper links so ballots could be accessed without disturbing seals⁸.

While intact, one seal was threaded through a luggage tag tie attached to the zipper pull and not to the zipper pull itself. If the luggage tag was cut, the bag could have been opened and resealed with a new luggage tag.

When I arrived one registrar was alone in the room with an open box of ballots. The ballots were in four cardboard boxes. She said the registrars opened one box in the afternoon to start making piles of 50 for the teams to count. The seals were hand numbered pieces of paper taped to the top of each box. The seals were not disturbed by the opening of the boxes.



⁶ In several forms, Column E, ‘Questionable Vote Totals’ was entirely blank. In all such cases we did not assume that auditors had made errors in completing the reporting form, but, instead, accepted that the audit had found no ballots with questionable votes. Also where Column D or Column F was not filled in, we assumed, for statistical purposes, that it held the number that would make the most mathematical sense, given the values in the other columns.

⁷ Although we observed a total of forty-seven (47) audits we did not observe every attribute of every audit: Some questions did not apply in some audits; observers could not fully observe audits that continued beyond one day etc.

⁸ All comments in this document have been edited for length spelling, grammar, and to make meanings clear.

- One (1) observation reported that some ballots were not sealed at all:

Only one bag of ballots had a seal. Two large boxes of ballots were taped shut with clear postal tape but had no seals. All were stored in a vault (storage room) adjoining the audit room... The cardboard boxes used as containers were not tamper-proof. Although taped up thoroughly, they had been re-used and re-taped many times and it would be easy to do so again without creating a tip-off that they had been opened.

- One (1) observation report noted a so-called ballot “sleep-over”. From our observer:

Registrar did not record forms at counting site. Took them and sealed ballots to office to record... There was a discrepancy between tape and manual votes and ballots. Instead of locking the ballot sack back up in the room and cupboard where it had been locked, the registrar took it home!

Transparency

The Secretary of the State’s Audit Procedures state that observers should be allowed to view every aspect of the proceedings. Once again, we point out that the random selection of races is performed in a separate event from the audit and, unlike the counting session, the race drawing is not required to be public. For the November 2008 election, the Secretary of the State chose to audit all races, going beyond the requirements of the law.

All aspects of the audit and as much as possible of the entire selection process should be transparent, open to the public, and publicized in advance in an easily accessed announcement. Ease of observation and audit credibility would be enhanced if the race selection were part of the Secretary of the State’s random selection of districts.

Observers report improvement in the opportunities provided to them by audit supervisors. However, reports show that

- four (4) observers reported that they could not verify that ballots were placed in correct piles.
- at one audit, observers reported they could not verify that piles were counted accurately.
- at one audit, observers reported they could not see that votes were read correctly.
- at one audit, observers reported they could not verify that hash marks were made accurately.
- in nine (9) cases, official audit report forms were not made available to the public at the end of the audit, so that observers were unable to verify that these reports matched either the hand-counts counting results or the tabulator tape results.

C. Guidance on Counting Procedures Inadequate, Inconsistently Followed

In our August report we warned of ongoing problems with counting due to a lack of detailed guidance on counting procedures. Unfortunately, our prediction was largely confirmed by our observers. We base this conclusion on the discrepancies in the official audit reports submitted to the Secretary of State's office, and in statistics that can be derived from those reports (Covered in the "Audit Statistics" section of this report). Specifically, observers note confusion over definitions and the lack of "blind counting" as major concerns. In addition, observers' overall impressions do not paint a picture of confidence in the counting methods used to create the audit reports:

- In nineteen (19) audits, observers had concerns that the auditing was not well organized.
- In thirteen (13) audits, observers had concerns with the integrity of the counting and totaling process.
- In thirteen (13) audits, observers had concerns that the manual count was inaccurate.
- In eight (8) audits, observers had concerns that the results on the reporting forms were inaccurate.

In more than half of the observations, observers noted that audit procedures were not followed:

- When using the *hash mark* counting method, twenty-nine (29) observed that a second official did not verify that votes *were read* accurately by the first official, nor that hash marks *were recorded* accurately.
- When using the *sort and stack* counting method, at least thirteen (13) observers reported instances where a second official did not verify that ballots *were piled* accurately.
- When using the *sort and stack* counting method, at least seven (7) observers reported instances where a second official did not verify that piles *were counted* accurately.

We have two concerns with the lack of checks and balances noted above:

- When a large number of ballots are counted by a single individual, miscounts can require tiring recounting and unnecessary investigating.
- A single individual could create inaccurate or even fraudulent results, compromising the integrity of the entire audit process and undermining public confidence in elections.

Confusion in Definitions

There continues to be confusion in the definitions of "ballots with questionable votes" (marks that the machine may have misread) and those that should be considered "undisputed ballots". In this round of audits, there was also confusion over how to classify ballots with two votes for cross-endorsed candidates and how to count those votes.

On the official reporting form, some towns fail to classify any ballots as having any questionable votes. Other towns mistakenly find the difference between the machine count and the hand count in a particular race and record it as the number of ballots with questionable votes. These conclusions are supported by the detail in the 'Audit Statistics' section of this report.

Reportedly, several towns classified ballots with two votes for cross-endorsed candidates as ballots with questionable votes and, further, failed to provide instructions on how to count such votes. Some counting teams counted two votes for the same candidate as two votes; other teams considered them overvotes and did not count them at all. Many officials commented that two votes for cross-endorsed candidates were the cause of discrepancies between hand counts and tabulator totals in the audit reports.

Lack of "Blind Counting" Procedures

Blind counting is a method of counting without pre-conceived knowledge of the expected outcome. When counting teams know the tabulator totals or know the differences between their counts and the machine totals, there is a natural human tendency to seek to make the hand count match the tape by taking shortcuts or finding a ready explanation. This lowers the credibility and confidence in the audit results.

- In thirteen (13) observations, counters knew the tabulator totals while they were counting.
- In twenty-one (21) observations, counters knew the difference between their initial hand counts and the tabulator totals while they were recounting.

III. Audit Statistics

A. Ballot Count Discrepancies

As mentioned earlier in this report, several audit reports are incomplete. We have no way of analyzing the data that was not provided; therefore we have no basis to conclude that the machines counted ballots accurately, which is the basic purpose of the audit. For the purposes of this section we have disregarded incomplete reports.

Among our greatest concerns are the discrepancies in data where no thorough or reasonable explanation is provided by election officials. Some of the most outstanding examples are presented in Table 1 below. This table shows, in ten voting districts, the discrepancies between the numbers of ballots counted by hand and the numbers of ballots processed by the tabulators on Election Day, as recorded on optical scanners' tabulator tapes. In nine of these districts, the tabulator processed more ballots than were counted by hand, ranging from 9 to 24 ballots. In the tenth district, the hand-count included 7 more ballots than were processed by the tabulator.

Hand Counted Ballots	Tabulator Counted Ballots	Difference	%
2929	2953	24	0.8%
1140	1155	15	1.3%
2234	2248	14	0.6%
2228	2242	14	0.6%
4718	4731	13	0.3%
1216	1228	12	1.0%
1155	1167	12	1.0%
2435	2444	9	0.4%
1497	1506	9	0.6%
1080	1073	7	0.7%

Table 1: Discrepancies in Numbers of Ballots Counted by Hand vs. Counted by Tabulator in Ten Districts, November 2008 Audits

Statements on the official audit reports:

[Differences] can be attributed to disputed ballots not being processed by the optical scanner OR human error in the manual counting of the ballots.

We were off by a small marginal number, we recounted those offices twice.

For those races that are over with the hand count number, either human error is a factor or the tabulator did not count all the disputed ballots.

*“In my opinion the Accu-Vote machines are in-accurate”...Registrar
“I am in agreement with [The Registrar]” –Registrar Elect*

Possible machine error.

At the end of the audit we found discrepancies of up to 4 votes in 3 individual races. We are at a loss to explain this. We very carefully had 2 counters count 50 ballots and then 2 more counters count the same 50 ballots. When there was a discrepancy between the results of the two counts, the registrars counted the ballots a 3rd time to determine the result...We have all of the ballots in their original batches of 50 along with two sets of tally sheets and an accompanying audit sheet and they are available for examination at any time.

Based on observer reports, we do not believe that all of the hand counts are accurate because of the questionable counting methods observed. On the other hand, because of these discrepancies, we have no basis to conclude that the scanners all counted ballots accurately either.

B. “Questionable” Votes and “Undisputed” Ballots

Observations and comments from election officials indicate confusion about classifying “undisputed ballots” and about counting “questionable votes”. An undisputed ballot is a ballot with no apparent problem or questionable votes on it. A questionable vote is a mark on a ballot that may not have been read properly by the optical scanner. Audits exhibited a variety of interpretations of what constitutes “undisputed” and “ballots with questionable votes”. Audit statistics confirm these observations.

- Sixteen (16) districts were reported as having zero (0) ballots with questionable votes.
- On average, audits reported 1% questionable votes.

C. Vote Count Accuracy

Even considering confusion over ballots with questionable votes, an analysis of the district reports submitted to the Secretary of the State indicates that vote count discrepancies remain.

For example, Table 2 presents, by number and percentage, some of the larger vote differences between handcounted votes and machine counted votes in ten races, even when all ballots with questionable votes are included. The discrepancies listed range from 11 votes to 351 votes.

Col C Machine Totals (Tape)	Col F Hand Count Totals	Difference	%
222	118	104	46.8%
119	65	54	45.4%
813	462	351	43.2%
815	467	348	42.7%
217	162	55	25.3%
280	224	56	20.0%
278	226	52	18.7%
105	94	11	10.5%
1080	1001	79	7.3%
1558	1451	107	6.9%

Table 2: Selected races where hand-counted Votes (Including ballots with questionable votes) and Machine-Counted Votes Show Discrepancies.

Table 3 presents some of the larger differences, by count and percentage, where the machine counted votes did not equal the handcounted votes in ten non-cross-endorsed races. This table excludes all questionable votes. Discrepancies listed range from 29 votes to 366 votes.

Col C Machine Totals (Tape)	Col D (Undisputed Ballot Totals)	Difference	%
1723	2089	366	17.52%
827	940	113	12.02%
1289	1457	168	11.53%
1239	1370	131	9.56%
1194	1316	122	9.27%
1368	1465	97	6.62%
759	809	50	6.18%
1168	1224	56	4.58%
758	787	29	3.68%
1376	1421	45	0.80%

Table 3: Selected Races Where Hand-Counted Votes (Undisputed Ballots) and Machine Counted Votes Show Discrepancies.

Reference Statistics:

Detailed base data can be found at:
<http://www.CTElectionAudit.org/Reports/Nov2008.htm>

Appendix A: Comments Submitted With Official Audit Reports

Officials made comments on the official audit reports and in several cases added pages with extended comments. Most comments involved explaining the differences/discrepancies in the counts. Many attributed discrepancies to human counting errors and some to the tabulators. Here are some selected comments, like all comments in this report, these are edited for brevity, spelling and grammar:

This section contains relevant comments not used in the body of the reports.
Moderator did not seal 5 write-in ballots in transfer case. Her claim was she brought them in to Registrar's office on election night. Cannot find. No write-in votes were counted on election night.

Human error [several times this was the only comment]

The double endorsed candidates were difficult to count so as to match up with the tabulator totals. This could be human error or a problem with the machine.

Per Moderator and assistants: Report of two (2) tabulator jams where ballots jumped into slot and may not have been counted.

Thirteen (13) ballots listed Unknown passed through the scanner listing various non-legal names as candidates for the offices indicated.

We even found one ballot that had both Courtney and Sullivan marked – this ballot was not rejected... We question the validity of including the “unk” as part of the total. We believe this inconsistency needs to be addressed.

We found pretty good agreement between hand-counts and the machine totals, which were usually within a few votes of one another...we feel it is difficult to audit machine function when you are hand counting five races... While it might be fairly simple to resolve discrepancies between machine and hand-counts by carefully re-counting a single race, the same does not hold for re-counting five races, when counter fatigue impedes accuracy. The problem is exacerbated when re-counts must be done on the same day as the initial count, due to the narrow window for counting audits and the requirement to audit more than one precinct.

If the intent of the audit is to measure accuracy of the machine counting, then this type of audit did not seem to address it very well...Against this background of increased human error, it is difficult to distinguish subtle errors in machine function from human tabulation mistakes, thwarting the purpose of the audit.

Recount conducted on 11/25/08, audit conducted on 11/24/2008 was not acceptable due to what appeared to be errors in count totals. Audit officials stated they felt unnerved by audit observers on 11/25/2008.

The only explanation we thought of is 9 (nine) ballots from the “write-in” bin were put through a second time. After a discussion with the moderator and both assistant registrars, the ballot box was emptied two times during the day and at the end of the election. No one could remember if anyone put the ballots through a second time.

Appendix B: On Site Supervisor Interviews

One page of our observation report forms, titled *Interview On Site Supervisor(s)*, is used to gain information on several aspects of the election and post-election audit processes.

UConn memory card audit reports⁹ and anecdotal reports¹⁰ indicated significant problems with memory cards malfunctioning with what UConn characterizes as “Junk Data”. Our survey results are consistent with other reports:

- Sixteen (16) towns reported memory card problems during pre-election testing or on election day
- Thirteen (13) towns reported scanner problems on Election Day. Confirming UConn test reports, several registrars reported copying cards which is against published procedures of the Secretary of the State:

In pre-election testing, a couple of the cards were found not to be programmed, so they told him how to program step-by-step. He accomplished this and it was not a problem because they have back-up cards.

Sent each 3 memory cards for each scanner for 2 districts; third memory card wasn't working. then showed them how to fix it over the phone conversation.

They had one memory card problem. A person from LHS walked them through the copying process on the phone. (They did not know it was a copying process, but I deduced that because the process required them to put a different memory card in the tabulator)

We also asked supervisors, usually registrars, for suggestions on improving the process of the audits or our observations: Here are their comments as reported by observers¹¹:

There should be some type of formula so that audits are distributed more evenly. For example, [our town] has had 4 audits in the last 3 elections.

1. Conduct the random drawing of districts earlier so they have more time to schedule people to work the audit. 2. Requirement at last minute to audit 5 races increased audit time substantially.

Less races! Ballot too confusing. Major/minor parties - too many votes with 2 votes for same candidate

⁹ UConn VoTeR Center: <http://voter.engr.uconn.edu/voter/Reports.html> Due to the nature of the collection/selection of cards for the UConn studies they do not represent a true random sample of cards sent to towns.

¹⁰ See: <http://www.ctvoterscount.org/?p=111> for summary and links to reports from Dori Smith of TalkNationRadio.

¹¹ All comments in this document have been edited for length, for grammar, and to make meanings clear.

Cross-endorsement is confusing for voters & counters. Because this was the first audit they have done, the counters were all inexperienced and the election officials underestimated the amount of time everything would take.

Rather than hand counting, using alternative machine to check original machine count on virgin card

They complained that they've been selected for every one, and they wish someone else would get a turn.

Send out information earlier. Tried to confirm date and time, but there was no response from the Secretary of the State. Monday morning they called department lawyer and given the OK to proceed with the audit on the date chosen.

Better sense of direction from Secretary of the State on how to conduct the audit. Concerns the way towns all picked as to who is going to be audited.

Color code ballots for all districts. Suggest recount by machine. Train teams to moderate and conduct audits, not Registrars.

Cross endorsements should not be allowed.

Observers questions should be limited. More time between election and audit.

Some improvements have been made, seem to work well. The maximum number of audits per town/city should be re-examined.

Registrars would like to get to do away with the disabled phone ballot recording devices and have it replaced with something that works easier? Batteries that get installed are too heavy to lift for folks?

Pay raise for registrars. Should not audit a town more than once. Believe this is irrelevant, as they believe they have been promised this is the last time CT will have an audit. (They declined to disclose who had told them this)

ROVs felt that moderator's return is "unnecessarily complicated". The ROVs are part time and paid for 6 hours a week each. That is not how much they really work. They say that SOTS sends out info as if they are there 5 days a week

There was little training and counseling and would like more information. The instructions were clear but need more detail. New seals that don't break.

It was unexpected that five offices would be counted, according to audit rules only 1 federal +1 would be audited. Feel that hand count is not the best due to human error possibilities. Suggest that it would be more efficient if the audit is done by re-scanning votes and matching to original tape.

Audit extremely costly for town. Suggest the state pay for future audits.

More time needed - notifying sent to unaccesssible e-mail address. Got notification from another town. Unsatisfactory communication from Secretary of the State's Office

Appendix C: Additional Observation Comments

This report focuses on concerns with the audits. In this section we present selected observer comments not referenced elsewhere in the report. As in past reports there were many comments complimentary of election officials, making observers welcome and demonstrating their commitment to serving the voters of Connecticut. There were also many comments expressing concerns with the audit process. Comments included:

The Registrars were very accommodating and had no objections to this observer's presence and were very open to any questions, etc. that I had throughout the audit.

Very open, cordial process, observers were made welcome.

It was a professional atmosphere and efficient. Pleasant but not overly friendly.

The moderator was thorough. Was afraid he would forget something as this was his first audit.

Welcomed to group and included in all conversations held by registrars regarding audit. Overall the audit process was well thought-out by these Registrars

Supervisor gave very clear counting directions.

Workers had earlier received written instructions.

Helpful and friendly group.

Then numbers hand counted for a candidate did not match the machine tallies the teams were asked to recount because the total was off by whatever specific amount and the teams were told what number they were off by...discrepancies were resolved by adding in number from "questionable" ballots and ballots that had "write-ins"

Copies of the procedures were given to each of the three two member teams. Supervisor just said to use hash marks...no further explanation

The counting procedures used initially had been successful with audits of elections with only one race; they failed to work in an election with multiple races. Major adjustments based on the morning's experiences had to be made.

Supervisor tried to review the Procedures' examples of disputed ballots with the counters, but everyone found them confusing and the supervisor even disagreed with one, so the supervisor directed them to use a conservative definition of disputed ballots.

The supervisors had the auditors take an oath to perform their duty lawfully. She quickly explained the purpose of the audit, she handed out one copy of the state's recommendations and regulations to each pair of auditors.

Town Hall's meeting room was large room...this allowed for easy stacking of all ballots on the large table and was organized in a manner that kept those ballots separate from those still needing to be worked on, avoiding confusion.

All ballots were put in cardboard boxes after the audit. Closed with 2" scotch tape wrapped around each carton and the carton marked with the district number. The boxes were then locked in the audit room to be picked up by registrar staff

Extremely casual team and casual approach to audit. No moderator's return was actually brought out at the audit, and the machine tapes were pulled out of a manila folder

It seemed to me that some assumptions were made at the beginning because folks had counted ballots before, and so a set of counters was counting Courtney 2 times until it was caught and corrected to the decided on plan of only counting once

It seems to me that even with experienced workers one might want to review the days procedures. They had tested the machines before the election and were satisfied it would be accurate, but it seemed to have failed them with the double Courtney ballots.

Any ballot with a problem was not counted - if there was an overvote in one space the entire ballot was marked disputed.

Overvote ballots caused problem - not sure if all overvotes were handled the same way - Counters did not double check by recounting ballots & marking off. Ballots were balanced using the tape totals.

At the start of the audit the counters knew only the # of ballots cast not the numbers for each race. As the day went on several workers looked at the tape & checked numbers for 3 party candidates and unknown.

Although they were performing as instructed by the registrar, it was not clear if these instructions were correct. So it is possible that the counters were not placing ballots in the correct stacks.

The two supervising registrars sometimes gave conflicting or inconsistent instructions or they changed instructions over the counting duration (i.e. with regard to what categories composed what was undisputed, what was the definition of "unknown" ...Each time the teams were given new instructions on how to count, they followed them properly. Sometimes different sets of instructions resulted in a different count however.

During the training I was pleased to hear the Registrar tell the teams that two people should make sure that the ballots were read correctly and that the hash marks were made correctly...I was quickly disappointed when three of four teams did not verify the work and the supervisors did not observe what the teams were doing.

They were told to get into teams of 1 republican and 1 democrat and that they would be validating the machine counts not voter intent. The counting approach was not explained up front but counters were told what to do bit by bit.

The tape totals were quite openly shared with counters and referred to at different points in the process, strongly suggesting a number of votes that needed to be 'found'. The official was asked by a counter what the machine count total was, and then said "Oh, maybe you are not allowed to tell us" and he then gave them the figure. That was at the start of the process.

The supervisor who is a machine technician and runs the pre-election testing reported having to copy 2 cards. He called the vendor who walked him through the process of making a copy of a good card.

I could not locate a serial number on any copies, the registrar could not either. The copy of one tape has no date, time or serial number. [One] district tape has a different p.m. time from the copy (of the tape).

They had one memory card problem. A person from LHS walked them through the copying process on the phone. (They did not know it was a copying process, but I deduced that because the process required them to put a different memory card in the tabulator)

Two teams asked me how to count dual endorsements, they had it wrong. I suggested to supervisor she explain to all nine teams, especially since it was early in the process and they could correct themselves. She did not see the need, but reluctantly agreed.

The county registrar coordinator was present to observe...[Training] detail provided to counters was sketchy. Reason may have been that counters had previous experience. Became necessary later in count to clarify procedure to use where candidates were endorsed by more than one party...All counts seemed to have some degree of discrepancy. Typically this was in the area of 10. [Dual endorsed] were off by more (30-40). Counters were directed to recount both of these, counting only the Democratic count. This did not seem to resolve the issue as the discrepancy became slightly higher.

Enclosed is a copy of the preliminary report sheet. Official did not complete final sheet at the time. Indicated this would be done over weekend. This preliminary sheet does not contain all counts.

Serious hash mark problems due to 1) mismarking uncalled name 2) omitting name called... Some counters simply adjusting their counts to match their neighbors... I saw one counter erase a hash mark to match her counterparts. I observed teams beginning to just give hash mark totals to each other without one team member. When I arrived they changed to giving numbers 0 both counting... The lack of integrity of the count, in this situation by some of the counters would be very high. Feel as if I am a proctor of an 8th grade testing period. ROV's did not observe callers or checkers during the counting.

The supervisors did not seem to understand the full purpose of the audit process because there was no general count of the ballots, and they did not separate out questionable ballots. They also did not make sure that there was consistency among the counting teams.

There was confusion with the process in the beginning because the scanners were placed in the wrong suitcases and the tapes were not printed and signed on election day. There was additional confusion in the ballot counting process... One scanner had a signed tape. There was no tape for the second scanner. The scanners were opened and new tapes were printed. One scanner matched the signed tape and the other was printed out.

Teams were not asked to reconcile differences. They were allowed to leave even though the numbers they obtained did not match those on the counter tapes. Some had carefully preserved their counting stacks, but were told that was unnecessary... Audit was not concluded. Too many unresolved discrepancies. Counters not required to recount. In frustration as day wore on, [Registrar] decided to take tally sheets and tapes home to work on.

Only one person brought the ballots to the room where they were counted. The ballots were left with me in the hall and if I hadn't held the door open they couldn't even have seen me if they chose to look... The ballots were kept in a room off the hall next to the Registrars of Voters Office. They were instructed to sign-in if they got into the closet and lock the door when they were through. There was a long list of names of people who had access to the closet

Although they were instructed to both verify the vote and each hash mark, they concentrated on their half of the process.

I felt that there was absolutely no regard to the security of the ballots during the day. On at least two occasions they were left out on tables with the door wide open and no one in the room with them... Who has access to the ballot storage area? anyone could walk in off the street and walk into the office since it is a working space during the day. It is locked at night.

Additional instruction on best methods to use for counting would have been helpful. Method was left to the discretion of each counting team.

Nobody know what the heck was going on, and there was conflicting understanding of e.g. voters' intent vs. machine function purpose of audit. The moderator...ran the audit and had not seen the instructions

Appendix D: Examples of Official Audit Reports

In this section we display and comment on seventeen (17) extracted¹² portions of the official Audit Reports submitted to the Secretary of the State. We hope that these examples will clarify the statistics and conclusions contained in our report.

The examples cover several areas of interest:

- Reports of audits with no discrepancies between tabulator counts and hand counts. These reports demonstrate that it is possible for election officials and tabulators to reach the same result when counting votes. They also demonstrate that the tabulators can count a wide range of ballots containing votes judged “questionable” by election officials.
- Reports demonstrating a variety of instances of incomplete forms missing ballot counts, missing columns of data, missing race counts, and inconsistent explanations.
- Reports highlighting some of the highest discrepancies between election officials’ counts and the tabulator totals.

These examples represent the most extreme cases of accuracy, omissions, and discrepancies.

¹² As has been our practice in previous reports, we have not identified the municipalities in reports. Here we also have covered candidate names for that purpose. These are examples. We could have provided other examples.

Example 1:

- No questionable ballots
- All counts match

C	D	E	F
Machine Totals (Tape)	Undisputed Ballot Totals	Ballots with Questionable Vote Totals	Overall Hand Count Totals (D + E)
317	317	0	317
381	381	0	381
14	14	0	14
278	278	0	278
371	371	0	371
369	369	0	369
298	298	0	298
300	300	0	300
366	366	0	366
336	336	0	336
291	291	0	291
16	16	0	16

Example 2:

- Counts all match in columns C and F
- Large numbers of questionable, all counted by tabulator

C	D	E	F
Machine Totals (Tape)	Undisputed Ballot Totals	Ballots with Questionable Vote Totals	Overall Hand Count Totals (D + E)
227	190	37	227
1246	1121	125	1246
9	9	0	9
139	118	21	139
975	880	95	975
78	71	7	78
28	20	8	28
28	25	3	28
134	119	15	134
962	864	98	962
76	66	10	76
38	28	10	38
56	53	3	56
983	887	96	983
89	84	5	89
41	30	11	41
170	145	25	170
915	830	85	915
100	87	13	100

Example 3:

- Incomplete form, no tabulator ballot count listed
- Questionable ballots, all read by tabulator

id: # 1247
 tabulator as shown on tabulator tape produced on election

number: Audit 11/20/08 #0512510 & # 0512509/ 11/21/08) #

C	D	E	F
Machine Totals (Tape)	Undisputed Ballot Totals	Ballots with Questionable Vote Totals	Overall Hand Count Totals (D + E)
429	410	19	429
804	777	27	804
6	6	0	6
485	469	16	485
640	628	12	640
12	12	0	12
36	21	15	36
22	0	0	22
8	8	0	8
294	285	9	294
829	810	19	829
40	25	15	40
23	0	0	23
351	340	11	351
752	732	20	752
45	38	7	45
10	0	0	10
440	427	13	440
671	649	22	671

Example 4:

- Counts all match in columns C and F
- All questionable counted by tabulator
- Note, arithmetic error in 1st line (724+4=728 not 730)

Total ballots counted by hand: 1493

Totals ballots counted by tabulator as shown on tabulator tape produced on election night: 1493

Ballot Carrying Case Seal Number (When Resealed After Audit): 0434728

A	B	C	D	E	F
Office	Candidate	Machine Totals (Tape)	Undisputed Ballot Totals	Ballots with Questionable Vote Totals	Overall Hand Count Totals (D + E)
President					
	Shay	730	724	4	730
	Obama	731	719	12	731
	Nader	21	21	-	21
Congress					
		888	878	10	888
		557	543	14	557
		10	10	-	10
		8	8	-	8
State Senator					
		951	951	-	951
		423	423	-	423
		26	26	-	-
State Rep					
		1035	1020	15	1035
Registrar					
		753	748	5	753
		590	583	7	590

Explanation of Differences: Noted on Moderator Return: Eighteen (18) ballots listed Unknown. Two (2) ballots cast write-in for Presidential Column. Twenty ballots (20) in total passed through the scanner listing various non-legal names as candidates for the offices indicated.

Example 5:

- Note explanation that discrepancies caused by two extra ballots
- However, two extra ballots caused counts of three extra votes
- And counts of up to eight less ballots

Total ballots counted by hand: 1,605

Totals ballots counted by tabulator as shown on tabulator tape produced on election night: 1,603

Ballot Carrying Case Seal Number (When Resealed After Audit): _____

A	B	C	D	E	F
Office	Candidate	Machine Totals (Tape)	Undisputed Ballot Totals	Ballots with Questionable Vote Totals	Overall Hand Count Totals (D + E)
PRESIDENT	MCCAIN	878	853	27	880
	OBAMA	706	691	18	709
	NADER	9	8	2	10
REPRESENTATIVE		1084	1057	29	1086
)	460	453	8	461
		9	9	-	9
		2	2	-	2
	E)	21	13	9	22
ST. SENATOR		784	767	20	787
)	713	702	7	709
)	22	13	14	27
ST. REPRESENTATIVE		1160	1127	29	1156
	REGISTRAR	897	866	23	889
		518	495	18	513

Explanation of Differences: TWO BALLOTS HAND COUNTED AT POLL WERE NOT DESIGNATED AS N/A WARR THEY SEGREGATED. THUS SOME OF THESE MINOR DIFFERENCES IN VOTE COUNTS ARE DUE TO THESE TWO BALLOTS

Example 6:

- Nine ballots missing
- McCain count, example of arithmetic error (960+7=967 not 969)
- Even so, some votes increased (including not cross-endorsed) beyond questionable count

Total ballots counted by hand: 2,435

Totals ballots counted by tabulator as shown on tabulator tape produced on election night: 2,444

Ballot Carrying Case Seal Number (When Resealed After Audit): _____

A	B	C	D	E	F
Office	Candidate	Machine Totals (Tape)	Undisputed Ballot Totals	Ballots with Questionable Vote Totals	Overall Hand Count Totals (D + E)
President	McCain/Palin	969	960	7	969
	Obama/Biden	1410	1390	16	1406
	Nader/Bonzales	45	45	1	46
Congress		413	416	1	417
		1514	1529	13	1542
		73	72	1	73
		125	126	2	128
State Senate		1037	1042	5	1047
		346	342	6	348
State Rep		798	793	5	798
		1288	1297	5	1303
		98	98	1	99
Registrar		801	795	4	799
		1264	1254	4	1258

Explanation of Differences:

Human Error

Example 7:

- Note explanation, simply recording and accepting belief in poor counting.
- Fourteen ballots missing.

Total ballots counted by hand: 2,234

Totals ballots counted by tabulator as shown on tabulator tape produced on election night: 2,248

Ballot Carrying Case Seal Number (When Resealed After Audit): _____

A	B	C	D	E	F
Office	Candidate	Machine Totals (Tape)	Undisputed Ballot Totals	Ballots with Questionable Vote Totals	Overall Hand Count Totals (D + E)
President	McCain/Palin	1016	982	13	995
	Obama/Biden	1193	1125	7	1132
	Kucin/Bronzales	25	3	0	25
Congress		404	381	7	388
		1343	1289	8	1297
		45	44	1	45
state senate		141	141	0	141
		996	961	12	973
state rep		319	298	0	298
		885	854	13	867
		1013	952	6	958
Registrar		92	89	0	89
		797	759	10	769
		1080	996	10	1001

Explanation of Differences:
 Confusion over ballots containing 2 votes, different parties, for 1 candid
 It appears at least 1 team did not count any votes for any candid
 on this type of ballot.

Example 8:

- Incomplete form
- Two ballots missing
- Discrepancies up to 8 and 9 in both directions

Total ballots counted by hand: 990

Totals ballots counted by tabulator as shown on tabulator tape produced on election night: 992

Ballot Carrying Case Seal Number (When Resealed After Audit): 0323354

A	B	C	D	E	F
Office	Candidate	Machine Totals (Tape)	Undisputed Ballot Totals	Ballots with Questionable Vote Totals	Overall Hand Count Totals (D + E)
Presidential	McCain/Palin	390	390		
Presidential	Obama/Biden	574	572		
Presidential	Nader/Gonzalez	22	17		
Write-ins		4	3		
Rcp/ Congress		258	249		
		557	560		
		23	23		
		74	73		
Write-ins		0	0		
State Senator		216	216		
		601	606		
		81	79		
Write-ins					
State Rep		224	223		
		670	678		
Write-ins					
Registrar		273	275		
		578	575		
Write-ins		0			

Example 9:

- Fifteen ballots missing
- Several counts exact, some others more counted by hand than tabulator
- No questionable ballots

Total ballots counted by hand: 1140

Totals ballots counted by tabulator as shown on tabulator tape produced on election night: 1155

Ballot Carrying Case Seal Number (When Resealed After Audit): 117942 / 117984

A	B	C	D	E	F
Office	Candidate	Machine Totals (Tape)	Undisputed Ballot Totals	Ballots with Questionable Vote Totals	Overall Hand Count Totals (D + E)
Pres./V.P.	McCain/Palin	293	293	—	293
Pres./V.P.	Obama/Biden	838	840	—	840
Pres./V.P.	Nadar/Gonzalez	20	20	—	20
Rep. Cong.		186	187	—	187
Rep. Cong.		717	782	—	782
Rep. Cong.		35	41	—	41
Rep. Cong.		45	19	—	19
State Senator		337	337	—	337
State Senator		700	698	—	698
State Representative		314	313	—	313
State Representative		654	694	—	694
State Representative		32	9	—	9
Registrar of Voters		279	275	—	275
Registrar of Voters		717	724	—	724

Example 10:

- Ballots missing
- Explanation seems to indicate should be more ballots than machine counted
- Write-ins counted in tabulator line

Total ballots counted by hand: 4718

Totals ballots counted by tabulator as shown on tabulator tape produced on election night: 4731

Ballot Carrying Case Seal Number (When Resealed After Audit): _____

A	B	C	D	E	F
Office	Candidate	Machine Totals (Tape)	Undisputed Ballot Totals	Ballots with Questionable Vote Totals	Overall Hand Count Totals (D + E)
President	McCain	1967	1905	40	1965
	OBAMA	2689	2629	47	2676
	Rader	53	50	1	51
	Write in	13	5	1	1
Rep		1012	982	24	1,006
		2925	2701	42	2743
		242	230	3	233
		219	201	12	213
		222	117	1	118
	Write in	1	0	0	0
State Senate		1558	1415	36	1451
		2264	2881	47	2928
		6		0	0
Rep		1537	1472	33	1505
		2758	2881	42	2923

Explanation of Differences:
 WE recounted the ballot totals (hand counted) 4604
 - moderator did not separate any bins from all ballots impossible to determine which ballots were hand counted election night
 questionable 114
 4718
 13 off

Example 11:

- Incomplete form

588

as shown on tabulator tape produced on election night: 588

(When Rescaled After Audit): 0341158

C	D	E	F
Machine Totals (Tape)	Undisputed Ballot Totals	Ballots with Questionable Vote Totals	Overall Hand Count Totals (D + E)
48	0	0	48
588			588
35			35
426			426
26			26
27			27
19			19
40			40
480			480
455			455
40			40
35			35
403			403
44			44
2			2
1			1

Example 12:

- Twelve ballots missing
- Form incomplete
- Presidential race not reported

Total ballots counted by hand: 1755

Totals ballots counted by tabulator as shown on tabulator tape produced on election night: 1167

Ballot Carrying Case Seal Number (When Resealed After Audit): 10024147

A	B	C	D	E	F
Office	Candidate	Machine Totals (Tape)	Undisputed Ballot Totals	Ballots with Questionable Vote Totals	Overall Hand Count Totals (D + E)
PRES	Rob Quinn	310			
	Chapelle	832			
	NADW	15			
Congress		183			183
		1758			1941 <i>2nd ct</i>
		55			55
		34			34
		34			34
	NOTE	4			-

Example 13:

- No ballot count
- Counted write-in's as votes but not for a candidate
- Discrepancies up to 23 in non-cross-endorsed races

Total Ballots Counted by hand: 2,297

Total Ballots Counted by tabulator as shown on tabulator tape produced on election night:

Ballot Carrying Case Seal Number (When Resealed After Audit) 8A - 0600782
8B - 0600775

A	B	C	D	E	F
Office	Candidate	Machine Totals (Tape)	Undisputed Ballot Totals	Ballots with Questionable Vote Totals	Overall Hand Count Totals (D + E)
Presidential Electors For	1A McCain/Palin	977	970	0	970
	1B Obama/Biden	1,255	1,282	0	1,282
	1E Nader/Gonzales	41	40	2	42
	1F Write In	14	16	0	16
Representative In Congress	2A	400	400	0	400
	2B	1,444	1,514	0	1,514
	2C	74	74	0	74
	2D	217	216	0	216
	2F Write In	1	1	0	1
State Senator	3A	723	700	0	700
	3B	1,362	1,368	0	1,368
	3F Write In	2	2	0	2
State Representative	4B	1,534	1,534	0	1,534
	4D	201	200	0	200
	4F Write In	11	0	0	0
Registrar of Voters	5A	754	742	0	742
	5B	1,239	1,246	0	1,246
	5F Write In	5	5	0	5

Explanation of Differences:

Example 14:

- All counts accurate, one ballot discrepancy
- Only last race has discrepancy, explanation says “feel” hash marks not counted accurately. Why did they not recount the hash marks?

Total ballots counted by hand: 2099

Totals ballots counted by tabulator as shown on tabulator tape produced on election night: 2098

Ballot Carrying Case Seal Number (When Resealed After Audit): 629581 + 629578

A	B	C	D	E	F
Office	Candidate	Machine Totals (Tape)	Undisputed Ballot Totals	Ballots with Questionable Vote Totals	Overall Hand Count Totals (D + E)
President	McCain	500	492	8	500
	OBAMA	1557	1545	12	1557
US Congress	McCain	32	32	0	32
	OBAMA	388	385	3	388
		1414	1403	11	1414
		90	0	90	90
		54	48	2	50
State Sen		50	49	1	50
		597	588	9	597
		1258	1255	3	1258
		79	80	0	80
House Rep.		48	45	3	48
		610	600	10	610
REGISTRARS		1336	1325	11	1336
		498	492	6	498
	[X]	1422	1408	14	1422

Explanation of Differences:
 [X] race - feel that hash marks were miscounted in the race -

Example 15:

- Discrepancies up to 93 votes
 - Write-in ballots listed as if counted by tabulator

Total ballots counted by hand: 4480

Totals ballots counted by tabulator as shown on tabulator tape produced on election night: 4480

Ballot Carrying Case Seal Number (When Resealed After Audit): 0454031-0454032,
0454033-0454034, 0591217-0591218

A	B	C	D	E	F
Office	Candidate	Machine Totals (Tape)	Undisputed Ballot Totals	Ballots with Questionable Vote Totals	Overall Hand Count Totals (D + E)
PRES. / VPRES	MCAIN	1973	1959	1	1960
"	OBAMA	2447	2449		2449
"	NADER	33	33		33
"	WRITE-INS	11	11		11
CONGRESS		2053	2042	1	2043
"		2175	2186		2186
"		26	26		26
"		28	28		28
"	WRITE-INS	2	2		2
STATE SEN.		2189	2160	1	2161
"		1941	1954		1954
"		84	76		76
"	WRITE-INS	2	2		2
STATE REP		1514	1497	1	1498
"		2698	2697		2697
"	WRITE-INS	1	1		1
Reg. of Voters		1868	1855	1	1856
"		2133	2040		2040
"	WRITE-INS	5	5		5

Example 16:

- Note explanation, ballot count “only off by 12”
- Note explanation, accepting belief that some batches not counted
 - Discrepancies of 351 and 348 (not cross-endorsed)

Total ballots counted by hand: 1216

Totals ballots counted by tabulator as shown on tabulator tape produced on election night: 1228

Ballot Carrying Case Seal Number (When Resealed After Audit): 117974

	A	B	C	D	E	F
	Office	Candidate	Machine Totals (Tape)	Undisputed Ballot Totals	Ballots with Questionable Vote Totals	Overall Hand Count Totals (D + E)
REP.	Pres./V.P.	McCain/Palin	207	196		196
DEM.	Pres./V.P.	Obama/Biden	983	974		974
IND.	Pres./V.P.	Nadar/Gonzalez	38	33		33
REP.	Rep. Cong.		119	65		65
DEM.	Rep. Cong.		824	307		824
GRN.	Rep. Cong.		56	57		57
WKF.	Rep. Cong.		80	252		252
REP.	State Senator		278	226		226
DEM.	State Senator		815	467		467
REP.	State Representative		280	224		224
DEM.	State Representative		749	346		346
WKF.	State Representative		42	155		155
REP.	Registrar of Voters		217	162		162
DEM.	Registrar of Voters		813	462		462

Explanation	C	D
unk.	- 38	36
unk.	- 38	35

"There are differences in some offices - it may be that several batches of 50's were accidentally not counted. The election tape and hand count of ballots are above - only off by 12"

Example 17:

- No ballot count
- Counted questions as well as races
- Discrepancies up to 366 (in an uncontested race)
- No questionable ballots

Total ballots counted by hand:

Totals ballots counted by tabulator as shown on tabulator tape produced on election night: 2556

Ballot Carrying Case Seal Number (When Resealed After Audit): 0516766 0516765

A	B	C	D	E	F
Office	Candidate	Machine Totals (Tape)	Undisputed Ballot Totals	Ballots with Questionable Vote Totals	Overall Hand Count Totals (DAEY)
President	McCain	1168	1224		
President	Obama	1194	1316	0	1316
Independent	Nader	40	40	0	40
Rep. Cong.		755	787	0	787
Rep. Cong.		1357	1494	39	1513
Rep. Cong.		43	23	0	66
Working Fam.		55	17	0	17
State Senat.		803	794	0	794
State Senat.		1368	1465	0	1465
State Rep.		1728	2089	0	2089
Reg. Voters		1376	1421	0	1421
Reg. Voters		855	878	0	878
Question #1	Yes	829	940	0	940
Question #1	No	1239	1370	0	1370
Question #2	Yes	1289	1457	0	1457
Question #2	No	759	809	0	809

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