By editor on January 21, 2015
Secretary of the State and her Office significantly improve integrity and transparency of the random drawing
Report findings included:
- Significantly fewer errors in the random drawing list in November 2014 compared to November 2013, finding:
- One (1) missing district in 2014 vs. sixteen (16) missing in 2013.
- Seven (7) non-existent districts on the list in 2014 vs. two (2) in 2013.
- Three (3) municipalities incorrect in 2014 vs. fourteen (14) incorrect in 2013.
- Improvements largely due to the diligence of the Secretary of the State’s Office, in leading compliance in 2014, with a law intended to fix past problems.
- A compliance failure rate of 2.4% in 2014 vs. 67% in 2013.
- We also appreciate that the Secretary and Secretary’s Office responded to our request to reverse past precedent and hold a public and transparent drawing of races to be audited.
Citizen Audit spokesperson Luther Weeks noted, “We applaud improvements made by the Secretary of the State and her Office. The drawing was significantly more accurate than last year and, for the first time, the Secretary chose races for audit publicly and transparently”
<Full Report (.pdf)> <Press Release> <Backup Data>
Posted in Report
By editor on August 27, 2014
Two members of the Citizen Audit Board assisted the Secretary of the State by randomly drawing 68 districts in 40 municipalities across Connecticut for the post-election audit.
See the Press Release from the SOTS Office.
Posted in Information
By editor on March 3, 2014
Citizen Audit Finds Little Improvement In Election Audits
Post-Election Audit Flaws Remain After Seven Years and Twelve Audits
The report concluded that the official audit results do not inspire confidence because of the continued:
- Lack of consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.
- Discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts reported to the Secretary of the State by municipalities.
- Lack of investigation of such discrepancies, and the lack of standards for triggering such investigations.
- Weaknesses in the ballot chain-of-custody.
- An unsatisfactory improvement in the random audit drawing integrity vs. the November 2012 audit, as reported in our recent Districts In Drawing Study.
Coalition spokesperson Luther Weeks noted, “When compared with audits in 2011 and 2012 we found little difference, positive or negative, on the issues previously identified and the level of concerns affecting confidence.
“Without adherence to procedures and effective follow-up, if there was ever a significant fraud or error, it might not be recognized and corrected.”
“Some officials follow the audit procedures and do effective work, yet a trusted audit requires that all the districts and all the votes be counted in the audit as intended.”
<Full Report (.pdf)> <Press Release> <Review detail data and municipal reports>
Posted in Report
By editor on February 19, 2014
Citizen Study Finds State Audit Flawed From the Start
Post-Election Audit Flawed from the Start by Inaccurate List of Election Districts
Based on concerns with the integrity of the random drawing in previous elections, the Coalition initiated a project to thoroughly check the integrity of the list of districts in the drawing for the November 2013 election.
Coalition spokesperson Luther Weeks noted, “The credibility of our elections depends on the integrity of the Post-Election Audits. The integrity of the audits in-turn depends on the integrity of the drawing.”
The report found,
- Fewer discrepancies in the random drawing list than were found in November 2012 and efforts by the Secretary of the State’s Office to improve the accuracy of the list.
- Seventeen (17) voting districts missing from the drawing list or recanvass list. The selection of two (2) fewer districts for audit than required by law.
- The audit law calling for the random selection and auditing of 10% of voting districts is not being faithfully executed, leaving the integrity and credibility of the audit and our election system open to question and expose it to the potential of future manipulation.
- The law intended to fix past problems is not being followed. — A failure rate of 67
- Fully complying with the law is complicated by the loose definition of voting district in the law.
<Full Report (.pdf)> <Press Release> <Backup Data>
Posted in Report
By editor on February 28, 2013
Coalition Finds Continuing Problems with Election Audit and A New Flaw
Post-Election Audit Flawed from the Start by Highly Inaccurate List
of Election Districts
The report concluded, the official audit results do not inspire confidence because of the:
- Lack of integrity in the random district selection.
- Lack of consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.
- Discrepancies between machine counts and hand counts reported to the Secretary of the State by municipalities and the lack of standards for determining need for further investigation of discrepancies.
- Weaknesses in the ballot chain-of-custody.
Posted in Report
By editor on November 20, 2012
Coalition finds 31% of Official Audit Reports Lack Critical Data
Municipalities failed to report data critical to audit evaluation. Increasing numbers choose paper only elections, avoiding scanners and audits.
The report highlighted concerns with two increasing trends:
- An increase in missing and incomplete official reports. There are 16 of 52 (31%) reports with errors making it impossible to determine if machines had functioned properly. What basis is there to trust audits, with this significant level of error in reporting?
- Up up to 19 towns avoided optical scanners and audits by conducting paper only elections. Such voting is not audited, not transparent, and error prone based on past observations of hand counts.
We conclude, based on our observations and analysis of official audit reports submitted to the Secretary of the State, that the August post-election audits still do not inspire confidence.
<Full Report (.pdf)> <Press Release> <Review detail data and municipal reports>
Posted in Report
By editor on August 1, 2012
Based on the size and relative simplicity of this audit, we provide an abbreviated report. We summarize the statistical information and observations, while we make no new recommendations.
Readers of past reports will note little change in our observations and conclusions; and little progress by officials in improving post-election audit integrity. Compared to past audits there were significantly fewer ballot count and race count differences in this audit. The fewer number of ballots and the single race to be counted contributed to this improved result. We are skeptical that this audit is an indication of future improvement.
Items of note include:
- Three towns selected for audit unsealed and combined their ballots from all districts, necessitating a town-wide count for the audit. This highlighted that ballots are not required by law to be sealed under a secure chain-of-custody during the audit period, only for the fourteen (14) day “lock-down” period originally applicable to lever voting machines.
- Despite the simplicity of the counting, several towns were unable to completely or correctly complete the official audit report form.
- One town’s report showed significant differences between the manual and machine counts for votes. The audit report form from this town was among those that were incomplete.
<Full Report (.pdf)> <Review detail data and municipal reports>
Posted in Report
By editor on January 26, 2012
Coalition finds continuing problems with audit integrity
Provides calculations and official data on the web for public review and verification
For the first time, in the interest of public information and transparency, we are making all official municipal audit reports and the data we complied available for everyone to review on the web. Citizens can see the reports from their own town, other towns, and perform their own audit of the Coalition’s data entry and calculations based on those official reports. The November post-election audits still do not inspire confidence because of the continued:
- Lack of integrity in the random district selection and race selection processes.
- Lack of consistency, reliability, and transparency in the conduct of the audit.
- Discrepancies between machine counts and hand-counts reported to the Secretary of the State by municipalities and the lack of standards for determining need for further investigation of discrepancies.
- Weaknesses in the ballot chain-of-custody.
<Full Report, Press Release, Excerpts> <Review detail data and municipal reports>
Posted in Report
By editor on February 9, 2011
Coalition calls again for legislature to act. Citizen observation and analysis show little, if any, improvement in November post-election audits.
The Coalition noted significant differences between results reported by optical scanners and the hand count of ballots by election officials across Connecticut. Compared to previous audits, the Coalition noted little, if any, improvement in the attention to detail and in following procedures in the November 2010 audits.
Posted in Report
By editor on January 12, 2011
Votes were miscounted and miscalculated adding votes to each candidate, but not changing winner in the race for governor
Each candidate for the governor’s race gained votes in the recount when compared to the officially reported results, as follows: Foley (+174), Malloy (+761), and Marsh (+19). These differences parallel candidate shares in the initially reported results. Counting of all ballots in the governor’s race resulted in differences in many counts, totaling 1,520 votes miscounted, of these 1,236 were initially under reported and 284 were initially over reported.
Simply printing more ballots only reduces the chance of the specific problem that occurred in Bridgeport. There are other causes that could result in a municipality having to scramble to photocopy ballots or perform hand counting such as a massive power failure or ballots lost in a fire, flood, or accident shortly before or during Election Day.
Posted in Report